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AN ORIGINALIST THEORY OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW
RANDY E. BARNETT* & EVAN D. BERNICK**
ABSTRACT
“Due process of law” is arguably the most controversial and fre-
quently litigated phrase in the Constitution of the United States.
Although the dominant originalist view has long been that the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clauses are solely
“process” guarantees that do not constrain the content or “substance”
of legislation at all, originalist scholars have in recent years made
fresh inquiries into the historical evidence and concluded that there
is a weighty case for some form of substantive due process. In this
Article, we review and critique those findings, employing our theory
of good-faith originalist interpretation and construction. 
We begin by investigating the “letter” of the Due Process of Law
Clauses—that is, their original meaning. Next, to develop doctrine by
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which this meaning can be implemented, we identify the clauses’
original function—their spirit—of barring arbitrary exercises of
power over people that rest upon mere will rather than constitution-
ally proper reasons. We contend that the original letter and spirit of
the “due process of law” require legislators to exercise their discre-
tionary powers in good faith by enacting legislation that is actually
calculated to achieve constitutionally proper ends and impose a duty
upon both state and federal judges to make a good-faith determina-
tion of whether legislation is calculated to achieve constitutionally
proper ends. Finally, we confront hard questions concerning the
scope of the states’ reserved powers, acknowledging the flaws in the
“police-power” jurisprudence of the so-called “Lochner era,” and we
delineate an approach that will better safeguard all people against
arbitrary power.
By so doing, we assist legislators by providing clarity concerning
the constitutionally proper ends that they can pursue, aid state and
federal judges by equipping them to review legislators’ pursuit of
those ends, and help members of the public by enabling them to
monitor the performance of their legislative and judicial agents.
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A man ... cannot subject himself to the arbitrary power of
another; and having in the state of nature no arbitrary power
over the life, liberty, or possession of another, but only so much as
the law of nature gave him for the preservation of himself, and
the rest of mankind; this is all he doth, or can give up to the
commonwealth, and by it to the legislative power, so that the
legislative can have no more than this.
—John Locke1
INTRODUCTION
The Due Process of Law Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments are among the most frequently litigated and contro-
versial provisions in the American Constitution. As Frederick Mark
Gedicks has observed, “[i]t is difficult to imagine a more maligned
constitutional doctrine than ‘substantive due process,’” understood
as the proposition that the Due Process of Law Clauses impose lim-
its on the substance or content of federal and state statutes rather
than merely guaranteeing a particular legal process prior to the
deprivation of life, liberty, or property.2
The dominant originalist view has long been that due process of
law is solely a procedural guarantee that does not constrain the
content of legislation.3 “Substantive due process” has been long
1. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 67 (J. W. Gough ed., Basil
Blackwell 1948) (1690).
2. Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna
Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585, 588
(2009).
3. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1102-08 (1953); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF
RIGHTS 248 (1999); ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 461 (1935); HUGH EVANDER WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 705-
06 (1936); Raoul Berger, “Law of the Land” Reconsidered, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 27-29 (1979);
Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV.
366, 369-70, 372-73 (1911); Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT.
REV. 85, 96, 99; Walton H. Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, in THE CONSTITUTION
RECONSIDERED 167, 168, 176 (Conyers Read ed., 1938); John Harrison, Substantive Due
Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 502, 517 (1997); Charles M. Hough,
Due Process of Law—To-Day, 32 HARV. L. REV. 218, 221-23 (1919); Andrew T. Hyman, The
Little Word “Due,” 38 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2 (2005); Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A
Reconsideration of the Origins of Due Process of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265 passim
(1975); Robert P. Reeder, The Due Process Clauses and “The Substance of Individual Rights,”
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denounced as incoherent babble on par with “green pastel redness.”4
In recent years, however, scholars have made fresh inquiries into
the historical evidence and concluded that the case for some form
of judicial review of the content of legislation under the Due Process
of Law Clauses is weightier than initially supposed.
Among the most notable examples are Gedicks’s own work
undertaking to demonstrate that the original meaning of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause protects natural and cus-
tomary rights against legislative deprivations;5 Ryan Williams’s
investigation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which con-
cludes that the latter but not the former constrains the content of
legislation in certain ways;6 and Timothy Sandefur’s argument that
both clauses forbid legislation that has “no connection to a larger
purpose or goal.”7
Even scholars who continue to defend something resembling the
once-dominant originalist interpretation of substantive due pro-
cess have made important modifications of that view. For exam-
ple, Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell have argued that
due process of law requires judges to determine whether a legis-
lative enactment is in fact legislation or is instead an attempt to
exercise judicial power.8 On this “separation of powers” account,
58 U. PA. L. REV. 191, 204, 207, 210 (1910); Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 431, 440-42 (1926); Ralph U. Whitten, The
Constitutional Limitations on State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretative
Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses Part 2, 14 CREIGHTON
L. REV. 735 passim (1981); Stephen F. Williams, “Liberty” in the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Framers’ Intentions, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 117, 118,
121, 126 (1981); Christopher Wolfe, The Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 213, 217, 219 (Eugene W.
Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991). See generally Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in
the United States and the Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations of Legislatures
(pts. 1-3), 2 TEX. L. REV. 257 (1924), 2 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1924), 3 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1924).
4. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980).
We hasten to add that Ely was not himself an originalist. 
5. Gedicks, supra note 2, at 595-96. 
6. Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J.
408, 505-06 (2010). 
7. Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful
Rule, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 292 (2012). Sandefur does not identify as an originalist,
but uses originalist materials to make the case for substantive due process. See id. passim.
8. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers,
121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1677-79 (2012). For a similar view, see Matthew J. Franck, What
Happened to the Due Process Clause in the Dred Scott Case? The Continuing Confusion over
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the due process of law guarantees a measure of judicial review of
the content of legislation—if only to ensure that an enactment is
general and prospective and does not abrogate common law pro-
cedural rights.9
In this Article, we revisit the original meaning of the text—the
“letter”—of the Due Process of Law Clauses. We then apply our
model of good-faith construction based on the clauses’ original
functions—their “spirit”—of barring arbitrary exercises of power
over individuals.10 We contend that the original letter and spirit of
“due process of law” in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
require legislatures to exercise their powers over the life, liberty,
and property of individuals in good faith by enacting legislation that
is actually calculated to achieve constitutionally proper ends.
Further, the original letter and spirit of “due process of law” impose
a duty upon both state and federal judges to make good-faith de-
terminations of whether legislation is calculated to achieve consti-
tutionally proper ends.
In this way, the “process” required by “due process of law” re-
quires a judicial inquiry into the “substance” of a statute to assess
whether an act of a legislature is a law. An act that deprives any
person of “life, liberty, or property”11 is only a law if it is within what
Alexander Hamilton referred to as the “just and constitutional pow-
ers” of a legislature to enact.12 At the federal level, legislation must
be within one of the enumerated powers of Congress (including the
incidental powers to which the Necessary and Proper Clause ex-
pressly refers);13 at the state level, legislation must be within the so-
called “police powers” of a state, which are not specified in the text
of the federal Constitution.14 In this way, our approach provides
“Substance” versus “Process,” 4 AM. POL. THOUGHT 120, 129 (2015). 
9. Other notable defenses of substantive due process include BERNARD H. SIEGAN,
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron
Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST.
COMMENT. 315 (1999); Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV.
941.
10. See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory
of Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 32-36 (2018).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V., XIV § 1.
12. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 400 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009). 
13. Barnett & Bernick, supra note 10, at 43-44.
14. Id. at 41. The same is true for regulations issued by state administrative agencies
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guidance to state court judges enforcing their own state constitu-
tions as well as to federal judges.
In Part I, we consider the original meaning of the “letter” of “due
process of law.” In Part II, we consider its “spirit” or function. Part
III identifies the just and constitutional powers of Congress, as well
as those of state legislatures. A conclusion follows.
I. THE LETTER: THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF “DUE PROCESS OF LAW”
A. The English Origins of the Phrase “Due Process of Law”
There is not much dispute about the origin of the phrase “due
process of law.” Scholars with profound disagreements about the
meaning of the phrase in our Constitution trace the phrase to
Magna Carta, a series of concessions extracted at sword point from
King John at Runnymede in 1215.15 The crucial language is found
in Chapter 39, which provides: “No free man shall be arrested or
imprisoned, or diseissed or outlawed or exiled or in any way vic-
timised ... except by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land.”16 This language was directed against King John’s
notorious efforts to impose his will by avoiding the regular processes
of the common law courts, and attempting to rely instead upon
prerogative courts that lacked independent, presumptively impar-
tial judges, and traditional procedures designed to protect individu-
al rights.17
In the fourteenth century, when King Edward III disregarded the
promises made by King John, summarily punishing subjects outside
the common law courts, Parliament codified a series of statutes that
operating under statutory grants of authority as well as ordinances and by-laws issues by
municipal corporations that are acting as agents of the state. In our view, all police powers,
whether exercised directly by state legislative bodies or delegated by legislatures to other
entities, were understood in 1868 to be inherently limited.
15. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 3, at 1; Ely, Jr., supra note 9, at 320.
16. MAGNA CARTA, Ch. 39 (1215), reprinted in RALPH V. TURNER, MAGNA CARTA THROUGH
THE AGES app. at 231 (2003) (emphasis added).
17. See J. C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 276 (George Garnett & John Hudson eds., 3d ed. 2015)
(concluding that Article 39 was “aimed” primarily against “arbitrary disseisin at the will of
the king,” against “summary process,” and against “arrest and imprisonment on an
administrative order”).
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more particularly described what Chapter 39 entailed.18 A 1354
statute linked “due process of law” to access to common law courts
with judges and traditional proceedings: “No man of what Estate or
Condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or Tenement, nor
taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to Death, without
being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law.”19 In 1368,
when Edward III failed to adhere to this prohibition, Parliament
enacted yet another statute that specifically indicted the King for
bringing subjects before his council and provided that “no man be
put to answer without presentment before justices, or matter of
record, or by due process and writ original, according to the old law
of the land.”20
Thanks in significant part to Lord Edward Coke’s commentaries,
the phrases “law of the land” and “due process of law” became syn-
onymous. Coke invoked the Magna Carta’s constraints on royal
power to combat the absolutist claims of King James I, the first
Stuart King.21 His discussion of the due process of law and the law
of the land in his Institutes of the Laws of England reveals an
understanding of these two phrases that is concerned both with the
personnel and procedures that are required before people may be
deprived of what is rightfully theirs and with the legal authority
that supported those deprivations.
Coke interpreted Chapter 29 of King Henry III’s now-definitive
1225 confirmation of Magna Carta (corresponding to Chapter 39 in
the original), which provided:
No Freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or be disseised of his
Freehold, or Liberties, or free Customs, or be outlawed, or exiled,
or any other wise destroyed; nor will We not pass upon him, nor
condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his Peers, or by the
18. Id. at 39-40.
19. Liberty of Subject Act 1354, 28 Edw. 3 c. 3 (emphasis added); see also HOLT, supra note
17, at 40 (emphasis added) (“[d]ue process ... was construed ... to exclude procedure before the
Council or by special commissions and to limit intrusions into the sphere of action of the
common-law courts”).
20. TURNER, supra note 16, at 123-24 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 Edw. 3 c. 3).
21. See Paul Raffield, Contract, Classicism, and the Common-Weal: Coke’s Reports and the
Foundations of the Modern English Constitution, 17 L. & LITERATURE 69, 77 (2005).
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Law of the Land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or
defer to any man either Justice or Right.22
In interpreting this language, Coke drew upon a 1363 statute
which stated “that no man be taken, imprisoned, or put out of his
free-hold without process of the law; that is, by indictment or pre-
sentment of good and lawfull men, where such deeds be done in due
manner, or by writ originall of the common law.”23
It is clear that by “process” Coke meant a particular set of pro-
cedural rights and personnel that had long since come to be
associated with the common law courts.24 Yet there is more to Coke’s
exposition of “process of law” than “process”—there is also “law.”
The passage in which Coke identifies “law of the land” with “due
process of law” reads thus:
Nisi per Legem terrae. But by the law of the land. For the true
sense and exposition of these words, see the Statute of 37 E. 3.
cap. 8. where the words, by the law of the land, are rendred
without due proces of law, for there it is said, though it be
contained in the great charter, that no man be taken, impris-
oned, or put out of his free-hold without proces of the law; that
is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawfull men, where
such deeds be done in due manner, or by writ originall, of the
common law. Without being brought in to answere but by due
proces of the common law. No man be put to answer without
presentment before justices, or thing of record, or by due proces,
or by writ originall, according to the old law of the land.25
Earlier in his commentary on Chapter 29, Coke had translated per
legem terrae as “by the common law, statute law, or custome of
England.”26
22. Magna Carta 1225, 9 Hen. 3 c. 29, reprinted in 25 Edw. c. 29.
23. EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50
(The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2002) (1642).
24. Edward J. Eberle, Procedural Due Process: The Original Understanding, 4 CONST.
COMMENT. 339, 340-41 (1987) (“[P]rocess by writ was designed to secure the personal
appearance of a party before a court so that party could answer in person the charges against
him.”).
25. COKE, supra note 23, at 50 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 45.
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“Writ” was a term for the written authority for a civil lawsuit for
damages or a criminal prosecution27—according to Coke, such au-
thority had to be grounded in the “common law, statute law, or
custome of England”28—that is, grounded in what is called the
English constitution. Under this system, writs described the sub-
stance of a good cause of action.29 For example, what we today think
of as the law of contracts was defined by the writs of debt, detinue,
and covenant.30 To practice law was to know the common law
writs.31 Without conduct satisfying the substance of some writ, there
could be no liability.32 In effect, then, no one could be “taken,
imprisoned, or put out of his free-hold” through a civil suit or a
criminal prosecution” contrary to the English constitution.
James I sought to formalize accretions of royal power under his
Tudor predecessors by maintaining that law consisted solely in his
royal will. In particular, he claimed the authority to adjudicate
cases outside of the courts of law, explaining that “[t]he King being
the author of the Lawe is the interpreter of the Lawe.”33 These
assertions prompted a series of dramatic confrontations between
James I and Coke, who was then Chief Justice of the Court of
Common Pleas.
Coke affirmed that Magna Carta recognized the existence of a law
that was higher than the actions of the King, and denied that “[t]he
King in his own person [could] adjudge any case.”34 For such re-
sistance, James I eventually dismissed Coke—but James I could not
refute Coke.35 English judges held acts of the King unlawful and
refused to defer to mere executive will, instead exercising independ-
ent judgment in accordance with the law of the land, even if it
meant holding royal acts void.36 
27. See RANDY E. BARNETT, OXFORD INTRODUCTION TO U.S. LAW: CONTRACTS 1-4 (2010)
(describing the common law writ system and the particular writs governing contracts).
28. COKE, supra note 23, at 45.
29. BARNETT, supra note 27, at 1.
30. Id. at 2-4.
31. See id. at 1-2.
32. Id.
33. 5 W. S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 428 n.5 (1924).
34. Prohibitions Del Roy (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1342; 12 Co. Rep. 64, 64.
35. 5 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 33, at 440.
36. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 179-217 (2008) (describing how this
came to be understood as “an ordinary part of their duty”). 
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By the eighteenth century, the proposition that the law of the
land bound the King had become entrenched in England.37 The more
complicated question concerned Parliament. Philip Hamburger has
detailed how the content of the unwritten English constitution and
the status of Parliament as the highest court in the land created
impediments to any judicial invalidation of acts of Parliament on
the grounds that those acts were inconsistent with the law of the
land.38 Because England’s constitution was developed in part
through custom, and Parliament was the court in which customs
were declared or altered, Parliament’s “enactments amounted to
decisions upholding their constitutionality.”39 That is to say, “the
common law itself stood in the way of decisions holding acts of
Parliament unlawful.”40
Coke’s report of Dr. Bonham’s Case41 has been interpreted by
some as a declaration that judges may hold acts of Parliament void
because contrary to even higher law, perhaps natural law.42 The
case itself concerned one Dr. Thomas Bonham, who had been sen-
tenced to pay a fine and to be incarcerated for practicing medicine
in London without permission from the Royal College of Physi-
cians.43 Bonham brought an action for wrongful imprisonment.44 A
majority of the Court of Common Pleas held that the College had no
authority to imprison Bonham.45 In his report of the case, Coke
explained the judges’ reasoning thus:
The censors cannot be [ ] judges, ministers, and parties.... And it
appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will
[ ] controul Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to
be utterly void: for when an Act of Parliament is against
common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be
37. Id. at 194.
38. Id. at 237-39.
39. Id. at 239.
40. Id. at 238.
41. Dr. Bonham’s Case (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 646; 8 Co. Rep. 113 b.
42. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1689-92 (summarizing the debate over
the meaning of Coke’s words).
43. Dr. Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 646.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such
Act to be void.46
As Hamburger explains, Coke’s words must be considered in the
context of a long-standing common law tradition of equitable
interpretation—interpretation that, where the letter of the law was
unclear, avoided a conclusion that was contrary to natural right and
thus void in conscience.47 It is highly probable that Coke meant only
that judges ought to avoid concluding that Parliament had made
someone a judge in his own cause, unless the letter of the Act clearly
compelled that conclusion. Such equitable interpretation was itself
a component of the common law.48 Thus, Hamburger argues that
Coke was laying a “moral foundation for [an] equitable interpreta-
tion,” not claiming the power to invalidate parliamentary statutes.49
And yet, Hamburger finds that the notion that some kind of high-
er law bound even Parliament was expressed in the early eighteenth
century, in the wake of the imprisonment of five petitioners from
Kent by a Tory-dominated House of Commons in 1701.50 Daniel
Defoe and the Whigs drew upon increasingly influential natural
rights theory to criticize not only the imprisonments but the idea of
parliamentary supremacy.51 
Perhaps the most sophisticated judicial effort to grapple with the
tension between parliamentary supremacy and natural rights the-
ory was Chief Justice John Holt’s opinion in the 1701 case of City of
London v. Wood.52 Therein, Holt declared both that Parliament was
bound by natural right and that no judicial remedy was available for
a Parliamentary act that contradicted natural right—specifically, by
making a person a judge in his own cause.53 Holt affirmed that the
result of such an act would be to return individuals to the “state of
46. Id. at 652.
47. See HAMBURGER, supra note 36, at 54.
48. See id. at 54.
49. Id. at 274. 
50. An account of the imprisonment of the Kentish petitioners and the ensuing dispute
appears in Philip A. Hamburger, Revolution and Judicial Review: Chief Justice Holt's Opinion
in City of London v. Wood, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2091, 2097-111 (1994). 
51. Id. at 2100. 
52. City of London v. Wood (1701) 88 Eng. Rep. 1592; 12 Mod. 669.
53. Id. at 1602.
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nature”54—a condition in which rights were, as Locke put it, “very
unsafe, very insecure,” and the defects of which legitimate gov-
ernments were designed to cure.55 Such an act would be “a void Act
of Parliament”56—that is, void in conscience—and if it could not be
construed otherwise, “government would be dissolved.”57 Judges
would be bound to give effect to it—but the people might “appeal to
heaven”—that is, exercise their natural right of revolution.58
Fortunately, Holt found that the Act at issue could be construed to
avoid that unhappy outcome.59
B. The “Due Process of Law” in 1791 America
1. The Law of the Land
In the wake of Americans’ own successful “appeal to heaven,”
American judges did not face the impediments that constrained
Coke and Holt from holding acts of Parliament unlawful. American
corporations and colonies had written constitutions that could not
be altered by ordinary legislation, as did most states after inde-
pendence.60 Ten of the newly independent state constitutions in-
cluded law-of-the-land provisions that tracked the language of
Chapter 39.61 Scrutiny of Founding Era interpretations of these
provisions yields persuasive evidence that “law of the land” and “due
process of law” were understood during the time period in which the
Fifth Amendment was ratified to guarantee both judicial process in
courts of law and the application of law that conformed in respect
to its content to written constitutions.
The landmark 1787 case of Bayard v. Singleton62 is an instructive
example. Bayard arose from North Carolina’s confiscation of Tory
property.63 The Bayards, who were victims of this confiscation, sued
54. Id.
55. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 62. 
56. City of London, 88 Eng. Rep. at 1602.
57. Hamburger, supra note 50, at 2100.
58. LOCKE, supra note 1, at 84; see HAMBURGER, supra note 36, at 215.
59. See HAMBURGER, supra note 36, at 209-10.
60. Id. at 398.
61. Riggs, supra note 9, at 974-75.
62. 1 N.C. (Mart.) 42 (1787).
63. See HAMBURGER, supra note 36, at 449-50.
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Singleton, the subsequent buyer of the property, seeking to recover
it.64 The legislature effectively acted as a judge in Singleton’s case,
enacting a statute that required courts to dismiss suits against
purchasers of forfeited Tory estates “upon the motion or affidavit of
the defendant.”65 Several dissenting legislators had raised constitu-
tional objections to the act, claiming that it would violate the state’s
law of the land clause by “deny[ing] ... the known and established
rules of justice, which protect the property of all citizens equally,”
and by “plac[ing] [citizens] under the adjudication of the General
Assembly, whose desire to redress the grievance may be fluctuating,
uncertain and ineffectual.”66
Although these arguments failed to win the day in the legislature,
the Bayards’ claims would be vindicated in court.67 Rejecting Sin-
gleton’s lawyers’ contention that “all acts of Assembly were laws,
and their execution could not be prevented,”68 the court held that
“the [C]onstitution (which the judicial power was bound to take
notice of as much as of any other law whatever,) st[ood] in full force
as the fundamental law of the land” and that the legislature had
deprived the Bayards of a right guaranteed by the law of the land—
“a right to a decision of [their] property by a trial by jury.”69 Indeed,
the court declared that “no act [legislators] could pass[ ] could by any
means repeal or alter the [C]onstitution, because if they could do
this, they would at the same instant of time destroy their own
existence as a Legislature and dissolve the government thereby
established.”70 Thus, a judicial process in which an act of a legisla-
ture is required to be in accordance with the law of the land set forth
in a written constitution that constrained the legislature—and is
64. Bayard, 1 N.C. (Mart.) at 42-43.
65. See HAMBURGER, supra note 36, at 451-52 (quoting Act of Dec. 29, 1785, reprinted in
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA, PASSED AT NEWBERN, DECEMBER 1785, at 12-13
(Newbern, Arnett & Hodge 1786)).
66. Id. at 452 n.150 (quoting Protest (Dec. 28, 1785), in THE JOURNALS OF THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 51, 51 (2d pagination series, Newbern, Arnett
& Hodge 1786)).
67. See Bayard, 1 N.C. (Mart.) at 45.
68. HAMBURGER, supra note 36, at 453 (quoting Correspondence (New Bern, June 7), PA.
PACKET, July 1, 1786).
69. Bayard, 1 N.C. (Mart.) at 45. 
70. Id. 
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therefore a “law” that is binding on the parties71—eliminated the
need for an appeal to heaven.
In 1784, Alexander Hamilton echoed the opposition of the dis-
senting legislators to the act that was ultimately held unlawful in
Bayard. In the same year, Hamilton denounced a bill passed by the
New York legislature that stripped Tories of their citizenship.72
Hamilton argued that the bill was “contrary to the law of the land,”
specifically, the thirteenth article of the New York Constitution,73
which provided that “no member of this state shall be disenfran-
chised[ ] or deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to the
subjects of this state by the constitution, unless by the law of the
land[ ] or the judgment of his peers.”74
Hamilton adopted Coke’s definition of the law of the land: “due
process of law ... [means] by indictment or presentment of good and
lawful men, and trial and conviction in consequence.”75 Hamilton
contended that “the legislature ... cannot, without tyranny, disfran-
chise or punish whole classes of citizens by general discriptions,
without trial and conviction of offences known by laws previously
established declaring the offence and prescribing the penalty.”76
Such acts of “tyranny,” he contended, did not become part of the law
of the land simply in virtue of their enactment.77
In 1787, Hamilton argued before the New York General Assembly
that a proposed Senate amendment to an act regulating elections
violated both the state’s law-of-the-land clause and a recently
passed statutory provision guaranteeing due process of law. The act
disqualified the owners of British privateers of vessels of war that
had attacked the “vessels, property or persons” of the United States
71. Id.
72. 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 483 n.1 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke
eds., 1962) (“[Hamilton’s] first Letter from Phocion was a public indictment of the majority in
the state legislature and the inhabitants of New York City who in violation of the fifth and
sixth articles of the treaty of peace not only refused to restore confiscated Loyalist property,
but ignored the prohibition against further confiscation or prosecution.”).
73. Letter from Phocion to the Considerate Citizens of New-York, on the Politics of the
Day (N.Y., Samuel Loudon 1784), reprinted in 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra
note 72, at 483, 484-85.
74. N.Y. CONST. art. XIII (Apr. 20, 1777), reprinted in 1 LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW-YORK
1, 9 (New York, Thomas Greenleaf ed., 1792).
75. Letter from Phocion, supra note 72, at 485.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 485-86.
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from holding any state office of trust.78 Hamilton denied that “the
law of the land” would “include an act of the legislature”—denied
that is, that legislative acts necessarily became part of the law of the
land.79
Again, Hamilton drew upon Coke, stating that Coke “interpret[ed]
the law of the land to mean presentment and indictment, and
process of outlawry, as contradistinguished from trial by jury.”80
Hamilton found confirmation of his position in the terminology of
“due process” adopted by the legislature, which connoted “the
process and proceedings of the courts of justice”—process and
proceedings which the legislature was institutionally incapable of
providing.81 As before, he rejected the idea that legislative enact-
ments necessarily became part of the law of the land, without
appropriate scrutiny by “the courts of justice.”82
Hamilton’s reliance on Coke in explaining the meaning of “due
process of law” and “law of the land” was not unique. Prominent and
widely cited American jurists relied upon Coke in interpreting both
phrases.83 These jurists affirmed the connection between the concept
of due process of law and the proceedings of the courts.84 St. George
Tucker, a Virginia judge who taught constitutional law at William
& Mary in the 1790s, wrote that “[d]ue process of law must then be
had before a judicial court, or a judicial magistrate.”85
In his highly regarded Commentaries on American Law, one of
the most influential legal minds of the Founding period, Chancellor
James Kent of New York, defined due process of law as “law[ ] in its
78. Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections, DAILY ADVERTISER,
Feb. 8, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 34, 34 n.1, 35 (Harold C.
Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962) (quoting 1787 N.Y. Laws 383).
79. Id. at 35 (emphasis added and omitted). Hamilton’s statement has been interpreted
to mean that the law-of-the-land clause did not constrain the legislature. See RAOUL BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 221-22 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2d ed. 1997) (1977). Given that
Hamilton was arguing that a proposed legislative amendment violated the law-of-the-land
clause, this interpretation is implausible. 
80. Hamilton, supra note 78, at 36.
81. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis omitted).
82. Id.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 85-87. 
84. See infra text accompanying notes 85-87.
85. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES app. at 203 (Phila., W.Y. Birch
& A. Small 1803).
1616 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1599
regular course of administration, through courts of justice.”86 In his
Commentaries on the Constitution, Supreme Court Justice Joseph
Story stated that due process of law entailed “due presentment or
indictment, and being brought in to answer thereto by due process
of the common law,” and stated that it “affirms the right of trial
according to the process and proceedings of the common law.”87 For
these jurists, due process of law required individualized depriva-
tions of life, liberty, or property to take place through the courts
with their judges and juries—thus forbidding legislatures from
denying access to the courts.88
The history of the drafting and ratification of the Fifth Amend-
ment is sparse. It is not clear why Madison chose to use “due process
of law” rather than “law of the land,” despite his own state’s support
for the latter phrase.89 It is plausible that Madison sought to avoid
conflation of the phrase with the reference to “the supreme law of
the land” in the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.90 Such conflation
might have given rise to the belief that the Fifth Amendment did
not incorporate any independent procedural requirements derived
from the common law but unspecified in the Constitution’s text—the
enactments identified as “the law of the land” identified in the
Supremacy Clause are all examples of written, positive law.91
Yet, it is significant that the proposal that ultimately became
the Fifth Amendment was, according to Madison’s original design,
to be inserted into “article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4”
alongside other limits on congressional power.92 It would have
followed the clause prohibiting Congress from enacting bills of
86. 2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 13 (N.Y., W. Kent 6th ed. 1848)
(1826).
87. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1783
(Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
88. See 2 KENT, supra note 86, at 13; 3 STORY, supra note 87, § 1783; 1 ST. GEORGE
TUCKER, supra note 85, app. at 203.
89. See Act of May 6, 1776, ch. 1, § 8, 1776 Va. Laws, in A COLLECTION OF ALL SUCH
PUBLIC ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND ORDINANCES OF THE CONVENTIONS OF VIRGINIA
33, 33 (Richmond, Thomas Nicolson & William Prentis 1785) (“[T]hat no man be deprived of
his liberty except by the law of the land, or the judgement of his peers.”).
90. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1724.
91. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1724. 
92. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
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attainder and ex post facto laws93—strongly suggesting it too was
designed to limit congressional action.94
As Chapman and McConnell have observed, moreover, Madison
emphasized the need for a federal bill of rights by pointing to the
fact that Britain’s declaration of rights had “gone no farther than to
raise a barrier against the power of the Crown,” and that “the power
of the Legislature is left altogether indefinite.”95 “[T]he people of
America are most alarmed,” Madison explained, that “the trial by
jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of conscience” are unsecured by
“Magna Charta” or “the British Constitution.”96 While the first
Congress would include the various provisions which we now call
the Bill of Rights as separate amendments,97 there is no reason to
think that this decision rendered the Fifth Amendment inapplicable
to Congress any more than it did the other subject-less guarantees
of the first ten amendments, such as the guarantees against
quartering troops or cruel and unusual punishments.98
At first blush, many of the early state cases interpreting “law of
the land” and “due process of law” appear to be solely concerned
with access to courts and the personnel and procedures associated
with the courts at common law rather than the substance or content
of the law being applied.99 A number focus on legislative interfer-
ence with the right to trial by jury and other procedural protections
traceable to the common law.100 Others focus on the statutory
93. U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 3.
94. Chapman and McConnell attribute similar significance to this initial placement. See
Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1722. 
95. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 92, at 436; Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at
1723.
96. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 92, at 436.
97. On the recency of the usage of the term “Bill of Rights” to refer to the first ten
amendments, see generally GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: HOW
THE BILL OF RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL OF RIGHTS (2018).
98. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1722-23; see also PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 255-56 (2014) (“[T]he Constitution recites its due process
and other procedural rights at its conclusion rather than merely in Article III, and it states
them in the passive voice ... mak[ing] clear that these rights limit all parts of government.”).
99. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
100. See, e.g., Butler v. Craig, 2 H. & McH. 214, 215, 226-27, 235-36 (Md. 1787); Zylstra v.
Corp. of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 387-88 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1794) (opinion of Burke, J.);
JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN, 1-36 (Providence, John Carter
1786), as reprinted in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 417, 417-29 (Bernard
Schwartz ed., 1971). 
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deprivation of “vested” property rights of specific persons who had
acquired that property consistently with the positive law then in
effect. Such deprivations were understood as adjudicative rather
than legislative acts because they were neither generally applicable
nor prospective in their operation.101 As Chapman and McConnell
show, Hamilton’s objection to the act invalidated in Bayard rested
on the latter premise.102
This appearance is deceptive. In the first place, viewing certain
common law rights that attached during judicial proceedings as
merely procedural is anachronistic. We have already mentioned that
the common law writ system was substantive in nature, with writs
providing the substance of a good cause of action.103 If the substance
of a claim against a person did not fit within the substance of an
accepted writ, there was not a good cause of action. 
Consider also the right to trial by jury. During the Founding Era,
juries could judge both law and fact. That is, juries could determine
whether an act was constitutional before applying it in a given civil
or criminal case to deprive someone of their life, liberty, or prop-
erty.104 The “procedural” right to trial by jury, then, was a means of
ensuring review of the substance of governmental enactments.105
Second, determining whether statutory deprivations of vested
rights were adjudicative rather than properly legislative acts re-
quired examination of the content or “substance” of legislative en-
actments to determine whether they were more like judicial decrees
or sentences than general, prospective laws.106 Finally, significant
authority held that “due process of law” and “law of the land”
required a legislative act to be consistent with applicable superior
101. See, e.g., Allen’s Adm’r v. Peden, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 442, 442 (1816); Bayard v.
Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 42, 45, 47 (1787); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 passim (1818);
Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 480, 482-84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (opinion of Yates, J.);
Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 306-07, 310-11 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
102. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1716. 
103. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
104. See CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 47-48
(2014). 
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., Allen’s Adm’r, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) at 442; Bayard, 1 N.C. (Mart.) at 45, 47;
Merrill, 1 N.H. 199 passim; Dash, 7 Johns. at 480, 482-84; Vanhorne’s Lessee, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.)
at 306-07, 310-11.
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law to qualify as law at all.107 It is to this last distinction we now
turn.
2. Distinguishing a “Law” from a Mere Legislative “Act”
Numerous Founding Era cases distinguish between a mere
legislative “act” and a “law.”108 To be a law, and therefore part of
“the law” of the land or the due process “of law,” a legislative act had
to be consistent with any higher laws, such as those found in the
federal or state constitutions,109 or in the nature of the “social
compact.”110
The proposition that only such acts consistent with the federal
Constitution became part of the law of the land can be found in
diverse Founding Era sources, both republican and federalist. In
the 1798 Kentucky Resolutions, republican Thomas Jefferson de-
clared that the Alien and Sedition Acts were “not law, but ...
altogether void, and of no force” because they violated the First,
Fifth, and Tenth Amendments.111 In his seminal opinion for the
Court in the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, federalist Chief
Justice John Marshall asked whether “an act[ ] repugnant to the
[C]onstitution[ ] can become the law of the land,” and answered that
“a legislative act contrary to the [C]onstitution is not law.”112 In the
1819 case of McCulloch v. Maryland, Marshall stated that “the
laws” of Congress “when made in pursuance of the constitution, form
the supreme law of the land,”113 the implication being that when
“the laws” of Congress are not made in pursuance of the Constitu-
tion, they are mere acts that do not become part of the “law of the
land.”114
107. See infra Part I.B.2.
108. See infra text accompanying notes 112-14.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 111-16.
110. See infra text accompanying notes 117-24.
111. Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4 THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 566,
567-68 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed., D.C., Jonathan Elliot 1836) [hereinafter 4 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES] (emphasis added).
112. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (emphasis added).
113. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) (emphasis added).
114. See id.
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State courts, too, affirmed this understanding in measuring leg-
islation against state constitutions. Judge Locke in a highly influ-
ential opinion in Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy
stated that North Carolina’s law-of-the-land provision forbade
“depriv[ations] of ... liberties or properties, unless by a trial by jury
in a court of justice, according to the known and established rules
of decision derived from the common law and such acts of the
Legislature as are consistent with the Constitution.”115 Another
North Carolina case explicitly distinguished between a mere leg-
islative “act” and “the law of the land”: “[W]hat is the law of the
land? Such acts of the Legislature only as violate none of the rules
laid down in the constitution.”116
Likewise, some judges did not consider a legislative act inconsis-
tent with the nature of the social compact to be a “law.” The most
famous such opinion is probably Justice Samuel Chase’s in Calder
v. Bull, the 1798 case in which the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a resolution of the Connecticut General Court
that granted a new trial in a probate proceeding.117 Lawyers for
Calder and his wife contended that the resolution violated the Ex
Post Facto Clause of the federal Constitution, and that the legisla-
ture could not, consistent with the Connecticut constitution, “act as
a court.”118 At the time, Connecticut had an unwritten, customary
constitution.119
The Court ultimately determined that the legislature’s actions did
not violate the federal Ex Post Facto Clause because that clause
solely forbade retroactive criminal punishments.120 But Justice
Chase also discussed the limits of legislative power under the
Connecticut constitution.121 Echoing the quote from John Locke that
appears at the top of this Article, Chase wrote that because “[t]he
purposes for which men enter into society ... determine the nature
115. 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58, 88 (1805) (emphasis added).
116. Ex’rs of Cruden v. Neale, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 338, 341 (1796) (per curiam) (emphasis
added); see also Tr. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 1 N.H. 111, 130 (1817) (explaining that
to be “law of the land,” statutes must be “not repugnant to any other clauses in the
constitution”).
117. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 386-87 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
118. Id. at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
119. Id. at 392-93 (opinion of Chase, J.).
120. Id. at 390-91, 395.
121. Id. at 392-93.
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and terms of the social compact,” even without an express constitu-
tion, “[t]he nature, and ends of legislative power will limit the
exercise of it.”122
Chase offered several examples of exercises of legislative power
that were sufficiently contrary to those ends that “it [could not] be
presumed” that people had authorized such power—such power had
to be expressly given, in terms that did not admit of doubt.123 Among
them:
A law that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other
words, for an act, which, when done, was in violation of no
existing law; a law that destroys, or impairs, the lawful private
contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man a Judge in his own
cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B.124
In a now-equally famous opinion of his own in Calder, Justice
James Iredell rejected the notion that legislative power was inher-
ently limited.125 He asserted that
[i]f ... a government, composed of Legislative, Executive and
Judicial departments, were established, by a Constitution, which
imposed no limits on the legislative power, the consequence
would inevitably be, that whatever the legislative power chose
to enact, would be lawfully enacted, and the judicial power could
never interpose to pronounce it void.126
As authority for his position, Iredell cited Sir William Blackstone
(who was describing the powers of Parliament).127
However true it now rings to some modern ears,128 Iredell’s view
of legislative power appeared to be an outlier at the time of the
122. Id. at 388 (emphasis omitted).
123. Id. 
124. Id. (emphasis omitted).
125. See id. at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 398-99.
128. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE
LAW 44-45 (1990) (“The better view of state legislative power is that, as Justice Iredell said
... it encompasses the power to make any enactment whatsoever that is not forbidden by a
provision of a constitution.”). 
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Founding.129 For example, in 1795, Justice William Patterson of the
United States Supreme Court, then riding circuit, stated in
Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance that “[t]he legislature ... had no
authority to make an act divesting one citizen of his freehold[ ] and
vesting it in another, without a just compensation,” as such an act
was “contrary to the principles of social alliance[,] in every free
government,” as well as “contrary ... to the letter and spirit of the
constitution.”130 Similarly, in his opinion for the Court in Fletcher v.
Peck, Marshall acknowledged that “[t]o the legislature all legislative
power is granted” but questioned whether “the act of transferring
the property of an individual to the public, be in the nature of the
legislative power.”131
In the 1792 case of Bowman v. Middleton, the South Carolina
Supreme Court evaluated an act that transferred a freehold from
the heir-at-law to another person, and also from the eldest son of an
intestate, and vested it in a second son.132 Those challenging the act
argued that while “there might be great and urgent occasions
wherein it might be justifiable for the state to take private property
from individuals, (upon a full indemnification) for the purposes of
fortifications or public works,” the legislature could not simply take
property from A and give it to B absent either compensation or a
jury trial.133 The court agreed, determining that the act was “ipso
facto[ ] void” because it was contrary to natural law and “common
right.”134
Textually, the Due Process of Law Clauses use four words, not
two: the “due process of law” requires that no person could “be
deprived of life, liberty, or property,” except by an act of a legisla-
ture that constitutes a “law.”135 And the “due process of law” entitles
every person to a judicial examination of, inter alia, the substance
of a legislative act to ensure it was a “law.”136 What exact quality a
129. Gedicks, supra note 2, at 651-54 (documenting how Iredell’s view was “largely rejected
by state constitutional decisions of the period”).
130. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 310 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (emphasis added).
131. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (emphases added).
132. 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 252, 253-54 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1792).
133. Id. at 254.
134. Id. at 254-55.
135. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V.
136. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 400, 406 (1819); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803).
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legislative act must have to make it a binding law is less than per-
fectly clear. But it is demonstrable that Founding Era courts and
commentators did insist upon some such distinction and were pre-
pared to hold legislation void because it was not law.
C. The “Due Process of Law” in 1868 America
The distinction between a legislative act or enactment and a law
continued to develop in the nineteenth century. A frequently cited
use of the distinction was Daniel Webster’s oral argument before the
Supreme Court in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward:
By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law;
a law[ ] which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon
inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is,
that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and
immunities[ ] under the protection of the general rules which
govern society. Every thing which may pass under the form of an
enactment[ ] is not, therefore, to be considered the law of the
land. If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of pains and penal-
ties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts
directly transferring one man’s estate to another, legislative
judgments, decrees, and forfeitures in all possible forms, would
be the law of the land.137
As noted by Chapman and McConnell, Webster was likely only
articulating a familiar distinction between legislation and adjudica-
tion.138 But the idea that legislative power was inherently limited
came to be understood as forbidding not only enactments that were
not generally applicable or prospective but enactments that were
not good-faith efforts to promote constitutionally proper governmen-
tal ends.139
In two Tennessee cases, Judge (and future Justice) John Catron
interpreted the state’s law of the land clause to require “general
137. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 581-82 (1819) (argument of Daniel Webster) (emphasis added).
138. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1765-66; see also Regents of the Univ. of Md.
v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 412 (Md. 1838) (“An act which only affects and exhausts itself upon
a particular person, or his rights and privileges, and has no relation to the community in
general, is rather a sentence than a law.’” (citation omitted)).
139. See infra text accompanying notes 140, 154, 157.
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public law[s]” as distinct from “partial or private law[s]” that treated
similarly situated individuals differently.140 Judge Nathan Green of
the Tennessee Supreme Court explained the perceived vice of the
latter in a decision voiding an act that created a special court to
handle all lawsuits brought against the Bank of the State of
Tennessee: such partial legislation was “the same in principle as if
a law had been passed in favor of some one [individual or corporate
body].”141 Obviously, if it were deemed constitutionally proper for the
legislature to seek to advance the interests of “favor[ed]” individuals
or groups, such enactments would have been considered un-
problematic. Put another way, judges inferred from the differential
treatment of similarly situated persons that legislation was de-
signed to achieve constitutionally improper goals.
By 1868, “due process of law” was a sufficiently familiar phrase
that Congressman John Bingham, the principal author of the
Fourteenth Amendment, thought it unnecessary to elaborate in any
great detail when questioned on the floor of the Thirty-Ninth
Congress about its meaning.142 “[T]he courts have settled that long
ago,” said Bingham, “and the gentleman can go and read their
decisions.”143
Which decisions? Although Bingham did not say, Congressman
William Lawrence mentioned Wilkinson v. Leland,144 Terrett v.
140. See Wally’s Heirs v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 554, 555 (1831); Vanzant v. Waddell,
10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 260, 269-70 (1829) (opinion of Catron, J.).
141. See Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 599, 607-08 (1831) (emphasis added); Bagg’s
Appeal, 43 Pa. St. 512, 414 (1862) (“Any form of direct government action on private rights,
which, if unusual, is dictated by no imperious public necessity, or which makes a special law
for a particular person, or gives directions for the regulation and control of a particular case
after it has arisen, is always arbitrary and dangerous in principle, and almost always
unconstitutional.”); see also Sears v. Cottrell, 5 Mich. 251, 254 (1858) (“By ‘the law of the land’
we understand laws that are general in their operation, and that affect the rights of all alike;
and not a special act of the legislature, passed to affect the rights of an individual against his
will, and in a way in which the same rights of other persons are not affected by existing
laws.”); Jordan v. Overseers of Dayson, 4 Ohio 294, 309-10 (1831) (denying that a state may
“pass a law for the purpose of destroying a right created by the constitution” and affirming
that judges have a “duty” to “hold [such laws] void”); Dunn v. City Council of Charleston, 16
S.C.L. (Harp.) 189, 200 (Const. Ct. 1824) (“Any act of partial legislation, which operates
oppressively upon one individual, in which the community has no interest, is not the law of
the land.”).
142. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866).
143. Id.
144. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627 (1829).
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Taylor,145 People v. Morris,146 and Taylor v. Porter147 while on the
floor.148 To illuminate the meaning of due process of law, Lawrence
quoted a passage from Justice Joseph Story’s opinion in
Wilkinson.149 In Wilkinson, Justice Story concluded: “That govern-
ment can scarcely be deemed to be free, where the rights of property
are left solely dependent upon the will of a legislative body, without
restraint.”150
Three of the opinions Lawrence invoked to expound the meaning
of due process of law never used the phrase151—indicating that, by
this time, the “due process of law” had become associated with a
concept of inherently limited legislative power. In Wilkinson, Justice
Story wrote that, whatever concept of government may have le-
gitimized the “uncontrolled and arbitrary exercise” of such power
“before the revolution,” that “great event” amounted to a national
rejection of that concept.152 In Terrett v. Taylor, the Court held that
a legislative land grant made to the Anglican Church by the British
Crown could not be rescinded—that the title to the property had
“indefeasibly vested.”153 Writing again for the Court, Story grounded
this conclusion in “the principles of natural justice, upon the
fundamental laws of every free government, upon the spirit and the
letter of the constitution of the United States.”154
Finally, in People v. Morris, a case interpreting the New York
state constitution (which at the time had no bill of rights) Judge
Nelson wrote that “[the] vested rights of the citizen,” including “that
private property cannot be taken for strictly private purposes at all,
nor for public without a just compensation” and that the “obligation
of contracts cannot be abrogated or essentially impaired,” are to be
held “sacred and inviolable, even against the plenitude of power of
145. 18 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43 (1815).
146. 13 Wend. 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835).
147. 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. 1843). 
148. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1833 (1866).
149. Id.
150. Wilkinson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 657 (1829).
151. See id. at 627; Terrett, 18 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 43; Morris, 13 Wend. at 325.
152. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 657.
153. 18 U.S. (9 Cranch) at 50. 
154. Id. at 52. 
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the legislative department.”155 In each of these three cases, judges
invoked inherent limits on legislative means and ends.
In contrast, the fourth case, Taylor v. Porter & Ford, contains an
extensive discussion of both “law of the land” and “due process of
law,” both phrases having been incorporated into New York’s
constitution by 1843.156 Yet, before discussing these phrases, Judge
Greene Bronson, echoing Locke, grounded one of the “ends” of state
legislative power granted by the constitution in the “social compact,”
namely, the protection of the individual rights of life, liberty, and
property: “The security of life, liberty and property, lies at the
foundation of the social compact,” wrote Bronson, “and to say that
this grant of ‘legislative power’ includes the right to attack private
property, is equivalent to saying that the people have delegated to
their servants the power of defeating one of the great ends for which
the government was established.”157 Not only was legislative power
subject to certain inherent limits—those limits constrained the
purposes for which legislatures could act.
According to Bronson, then, even absent any express textual
limits on legislative power—that is, any law-of-the-land clause—the
legislature could not “take the property of A, either with or without
compensation, and give it to B.”158 But, Bronson expanded, “[t]he
people have added negative words, which should put the matter at
rest,” specifically, in providing that “[n]o member of this state shall
be disfranchised, or deprived of any of the rights or privileges
secured to any citizen thereof, unless by the law of the land, or the
judgment of his peers,”159 and “[n]o person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”160
Relying upon Coke, Bronson declared that the “law of the land”
did not encompass “statute[s] passed for the purpose of working the
wrong,” and that it “must be ascertained judicially that [someone]
has forfeited his privileges, or that some one else has a superior title
to the property he possesses, before either of them can be taken
155. 13 Wend. at 328.
156. 4 Hill 140, 145-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
157. Id. at 145.
158. Id. 
159. Id.
160. Id. at 147 (emphasis omitted).
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from him.”161 Similarly, he explained that “due process of law”
connoted “a prosecution or suit instituted and conducted according
to the prescribed forms and solemnities for ascertaining guilt, or
determining the title to property.”162 “Mere legislation” could not
serve as a basis for taking someone’s property without permission
and giving it to someone else.163
To sum up, the decisions cited by Lawrence involve themes that
were echoed in numerous decisions by state courts as well as in
leading treatises on constitutional law during the Founding Era. A
legislative act was deemed not to be part of the law of the land and
was therefore considered insusceptible of being applied to individu-
als consistently with “due process of law” if (1) it deprived individu-
als of certain procedural rights traceable to the common law; (2) if
it was either retrospective or insufficiently general, and thus usurp-
ed judicial power; or (3) more generally, if it violated a written con-
stitution.
A fourth category of enactments that came to be understood as
contrary to the law of the land developed towards the middle of the
nineteenth century. As was earlier stressed by Justice Samuel
Chase in Calder, implicit in the invalidation of legislative acts that
were neither prospective nor general was a concept of legislative
power which held such power to be inherently limited by the nature
of the social compact.164 And the nature of the social compact barred
161. Id. at 145-46.
162. Id. at 147.
163. Id. 
164. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text; see also Regents of the Univ. of Md.
v. Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 408 (Md. 1838) (“[T]here is a fundamental principle of right and
justice, inherent in the nature and spirit of the social compact, ... the character and genius of
our government, the causes from which they sprang, and the purposes for which they were
established, that rises above and restrains and sets bounds to the power of legislation, which
the legislature cannot pass without exceeding its rightful authority.”); White v. White 4 How.
Pr. 102, 111 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1849) (“[T]he security of the citizen against ... arbitrary legislation
rests upon the broader and more solid ground of natural rights, and is not wholly dependent
upon [textual] negatives. The exercise of such a power is incompatible with the nature and
objects of all governments, and is destructive to the great end and aim for which government
is instituted, and is subversive of the fundamental principles upon which all free governments
are organized.”); Currie’s Adm’rs v. Mut. Assur. Soc’y, 14 Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 315, 438-39 (1809)
(“[L]egislature[s] [are limited] ... by the principles and provisions of the constitution and bill
of rights, and by those great rights and principles, for the preservation of which all just
governments are founded.”).
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any presumption that the people had consented to be governed by
a legislature with arbitrary power.
All of this talk of the “social compact” may appear to be very
abstract and therefore unhelpful to contemporary legislators and
judges who must resolve hard questions about whether particular
acts are constitutionally proper. But originalists must first go where
evidence of original communicative content leads, and only then
consider how best to implement that communicative content. As we
will see, excluding the category of arbitrary legislation from the
cognizance of legislators and judges would likely constrict the
originally understood scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
D. The “Due Process of Law” Is a Substantive Procedure
Our investigation of the original meaning of the Due Process of
Law Clauses reveals the prevailing dichotomy of procedural and
substantive due process to be unhelpful and potentially misleading.
To be sure, the clauses constrain both what the government can do
and how the government can do it. But their substantive and
procedural components cannot be cleanly separated. Once it is
acknowledged that the procedure or “process” that the Due Process
of Law Clauses guarantee includes an opportunity to challenge the
content or “substance” of a statute for its conformity with the
Constitution and that a statute that does not conform with the
Constitution is not a constitutionally proper law, the utility of the
distinction vanishes.
Consider the First Amendment. We commonly speak of “First
Amendment challenges” to the substance of legislation. Yet the right
to a judicial determination of whether a legislative enactment
prohibits “the free exercise of religion,” is part of the “due process of
law.”165 The due process of law guarantees a judicial forum in which
people can contest whether the substance of a statute prohibits the
free exercise of religion—and therefore is not a constitutionally
proper law.166 Further, a statute that does prohibit the free exercise
of religion cannot be used to deprive someone of life, liberty, or
165. Cf. Taylor v. Porter & Ford, 4 Hill 140, 145-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843); Williams, supra
note 6, at 464.
166. Cf. Taylor, 4 Hill at 145-47.
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property, consistently with the due process of law, because it is not
a constitutionally proper law.167
Despite the role they are playing in guaranteeing a judicial
forum, the Due Process of Law Clauses are rarely noticed in such
cases, and we speak only of the First Amendment.168 This is
analogous to how we now commonly speak of “First Amendment
challenges” to state laws, when such challenges are, strictly
speaking, Fourteenth Amendment challenges.169 Indeed, according
to the post-New Deal “incorporation doctrine,”170 they are technically
Due Process of Law Clause challenges!171
So too with a “Commerce Clause challenge,” which ineluctably
connects the substance of the Commerce Clause with a judicial
evaluation of the substance of an act of Congress.172 Any challenge
to a legislative act on the ground that the substance of the act
exceeds the proper constitutional powers of Congress or a state
legislature is, at the same time, a “Due Process of Law Clause
challenge.”173 It is the latter clause that guarantees a judicial
process in which the act will be evaluated before a person is
deprived of life, liberty, or property.174 Further, if the act is beyond
Congress’s constitutional powers, using the act to deprive an
individual of life, liberty, or property would violate the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause as well as the Commerce
Clause.175
167. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 1 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803); see also Gedicks,
supra note 2, at 668.
168. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004) (explaining that a state’s refusal
to give aid to a postsecondary student who was pursuing a degree in theology did not violate
the Free Exercise clause of the First Amendment without ever referencing the Due Process
clause).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
171. See DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM 109-10 (2011) (observing that “enforcing the First Amendment
right of freedom of speech against the states via the Due Process Clause is literally an
exercise in protecting a substantive right through that clause,” as is the incorporation of any
other enumerated right through the same means).
172. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243-44, 258 (1964)
(stating that Congress did not violate the Commerce Clause, nor the Fifth Amendment, with
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
173. See Gedicks, supra note 2, at 668.
174. See Taylor v. Porter & Ford, 4 Hill 140, 145-47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
175. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc., 379 U.S. at 258.
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The core question in every case involving a purported deprivation
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law is whether
that deprivation is consistent with the law of the land.176 As we have
seen, there are several types of defects that may cause legislation to
fail to become the law of the land.177 It is a mistake to reduce the
due process of law to one of these defects or another. And nothing
substantial is gained by dubbing one or more of those defects
“procedural” or “substantive.” 
Indeed, to separate procedure from substance is to risk failing to
appreciate substantive aspects of what seem at first to be solely
procedural guarantees—and vice versa. The right to trial by jury, in
which historically the jury could pass upon the constitutionality of
a statute, as we noted above, is only a particularly vivid example.178
Better to think of due process of law as requiring a “substantive
procedure”—that is, a judicial procedure designed to ensure that the
substance of a statute conforms with the higher law of the land
before any person can be deprived of his or her “life, liberty, or
property.”
While the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ Due Process of Law
Clauses both guarantee a substantive procedure, there is an
important distinction between the referents of “due process of law”
in each amendment. Under the Fifth Amendment, before any person
can justly be deprived of “life, liberty, or property” by operation of a
congressional statute, the due process of law requires a judicial
determination that the substance of such an “act” is consistent with
the higher law of the land provided by the substance of the written
federal Constitution. Specifically, a legislative act must be an
exercise of, or calculated to carry into effect, an enumerated
power.179 
As John Marshall explained in McCulloch v. Maryland, this
judicial process includes a means-ends analysis, in the form of an
assessment of whether a legislative act was taken in good faith:
176. See, e.g., supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
177. See supra Part I.B.2.
178. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
179. See Gedicks, supra note 2, at 668.
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[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers,
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal,
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say
that such an act was not the law of the land.180
By 1868, however, the concept of due process of law was under-
stood to impose limits on the ends which state legislatures could
pursue.181 And courts constructed a doctrine—the police power
doctrine—to implement that understanding.182 Like the principle
identified in McCulloch,183 this doctrine required that exercises of
state police powers be in good faith.184
As we will later discuss, the result of this distinction is that,
although the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments both place
limitations on the ends which legislators may pursue, the substance
of those limitations is different. The former are specified by the
letter of the Constitution;185 the latter are unspecified by the letter
and therefore require constitutional construction.186 This difference
has implications for the implementation of the respective clauses.
Before getting to the implementation of the original meaning of
“due process of law,” we need consider some alternative originalist
interpretations of this text that have been offered by scholars.
E. Competing Originalist Interpretations
We have shown that due process of law is, as originalists have
long maintained, a procedural guarantee involving the judiciary.
However, the judicial procedure it guarantees includes an opportu-
nity for someone who stands to be deprived of life, liberty, or
property to challenge the substance of legislation for its consistency
with the law of the land. And such challenges in turn require
judicial inquiry into whether enactments (a) abrogate common law
180. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (emphases added). 
181. See Williams, supra note 6, at 426, 462-63, 466-67.
182. See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
183. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423.
184. See, e.g., Austin v. Murray, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 121, 126 (1834).
185. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
186. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
1632 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:1599
procedural protections; (b) are adjudicative rather than legislative
because retrospective or insufficiently general; (c) violate express
constitutional guarantees; or (d) deprive people of life, liberty, or
property in the service of no constitutionally proper end, and are
therefore arbitrary. The last of these categories of unlawful leg-
islation—arbitrary legislation—is the most controversial and we
now we respond to some criticisms of adding it to the list.
1. Nathaniel Chapman and Michael McConnell
While acknowledging its existence, Chapman and McConnell
contend that judicial employment of a means-end analysis to
evaluate whether legislation is arbitrary represents a late, contro-
versial, and ultimately improper departure from a well-settled
traditional understanding of due process of law.187 They find “two
principal instances of antebellum courts’ applying due process to
invalidate a general and prospective law.”188 The first is Chief
Justice Roger B. Taney’s suggestion (in dicta) in Dred Scott that
an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States
of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or
brought his property into a particular Territory of the United
States, and who had committed no offence against the laws,
could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.189
The second is Wynehamer v. People, an 1856 decision in which the
New York Court of Appeals invalidated a statute prohibiting the
sale of liquor.190 The Court of Appeals reasoned that “[w]hen a law
annihilates the value of property ... the owner is deprived of it
according to the plainest interpretation, and certainly within the
spirit of a constitutional provision intended expressly to shield
private rights from the exercise of arbitrary power.”191
187. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1722-73.
188. Id. at 1722.
189. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450 (1857). 
190. 2 Parker Cim. Rep. 421, 468, 488-89 (N.Y. 1856).
191. Id. at 461. 
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These “radical” decisions, Chapman and McConnell argue, are
“faulty exceptions that prove the rule.”192 Because Dred Scott was
universally rejected by Republicans when they proposed and
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment, Chapman and McConnell
maintain that “it would be perverse to think that the public ...
understood it to perpetuate Chief Justice Taney’s approach to due
process.”193 They say Wynehamer was “immediately controversial”
and that there is “no evidence” that it had “any bearing on the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.”194
According to Chapman and McConnell, these two cases were
outliers and both misinterpreted the due process of law.195
But as Ryan Williams points out, while Dred Scott was profoundly
controversial among Republicans, “there is virtually no evidence to
suggest that such controversy stemmed from Taney’s use of the Due
Process Clause to protect vested property rights.”196 Justice Ben-
jamin Curtis’s dissent, lauded by Republicans, did not take issue
with Taney’s suggestion that Congress could not generally obliterate
vested property rights through legislation. Rather, Curtis focused
on the unique character of slave property, stating that “[s]lavery,
being contrary to natural right, is created only by municipal law.”197
This principle is traceable to a famous decision by the King’s Bench
in the 1772 case of Somerset v. Stewart, in which Lord Mansfield
declared that slavery was “so odious, that nothing can be suffered
to support it, but positive law.”198
As applied to the facts of Dred Scott, the Somerset principle
compelled the conclusion that slave owners’ property in their slaves
ceased to exist as soon as they voluntarily brought their slaves into
federal territory where slavery was legally recognized “for the
purpose of being absolutely prohibited, and declared incapable of
existing.”199 Dred Scott’s rejection by Republicans tells us nothing
interesting about the meaning of “due process of law”; and Taney’s
192. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1772. 
193. Id.
194. Id. at 1769-70.
195. See id. at 1772.
196. Williams, supra note 6, at 467.
197. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 624 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
198. 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 510; Lofft 1, 19. 
199. Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 593 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
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use of this concept in dicta does not seem to have stirred any specific
criticism or exerted any influence.200 Indeed, it is reasonable to
presume that Taney invoked the traditional and accepted conception
of the due process of law because he thought it would bolster, rather
than undermine, the persuasiveness of his argument.
Chapman and McConnell’s discussion of Wynehamer is similarly
deficient. Wynehamer was approvingly cited by multiple courts and
treatise-writers around the time of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
enactment.201 Those courts that did not follow Wynehamer deter-
mined that statutes prohibiting sales of alcohol fell within the scope
of the police power; they did not hold that, to be consistent with the
due process of law, statutes need only be general and prospective
and not abrogate common law procedural rights.202 
Indeed, none of the cases that Chapman and McConnell cite
expressly held that the due process of law was limited in scope in
the manner they propose; theirs is an argument from silence.203 As
we will see, there was more noise than they acknowledge; hesitance
to invalidate is not the same as refusal to evaluate.
When McConnell and Chapman note that the Supreme Court in
Mugler v. Kansas later upheld similar legislation,204 they neglect the
fact that the Court did so only after determining that the legislation
was “enacted in good faith, and had appropriate and direct connec-
tion with that protection to life, health, and property which each
State owes to her citizens.”205 Writing for the Court, Justice John
Marshall Harlan noted that the Court would not uphold legislation
if it was “apparent that its real object is not to protect the commu-
nity, or to promote the general well-being, but, under the guise of
police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and prop-
erty.”206 This is reminiscent of Marshall’s “pretext” formulation in
200. Williams, supra note 6, at 468-69. 
201. See, e.g., id. at 469 n.281.
202. See, e.g., Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1 (1854); People v. Gallagher, 4 Mich.
244 (1856); Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328 (1855). 
203. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1678 (“None of [the antebellum decisions]
invalidated a general and prospective statute on the ground that it interfered with
unenumerated but inalienable rights, was unreasonable, or exceeded the police power.”).
204. Id. at 1769. 
205. 123 U.S. 623, 666 (1887) (quoting Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 506 (1879)). 
206. Id. at 669 (emphasis added). 
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McCulloch.207 No Justice in Mugler disputed the proposition that
purported exercises of the police power—whether they took the form
of municipal by-laws or ordinances or statutes—needed to be
evaluated for pretext. Skeptics of the legitimacy of means-ends
analysis have yet to explain this consensus.
Thus, even if Chapman and McConnell are correct that none of
the cases they discuss saw courts “applying due process to invali-
date a general and prospective law,”208 they have overstated the
significance of this finding. The critical response to Dred Scott and
Wynehamer does not indicate a rejection of these cases’ holdings
that due process of law forbids general and prospective laws that
deprive people of vested rights without furthering a constitutionally
proper end. As Williams points out, the vested-rights interpretation
implicit in both decisions was endorsed by state courts throughout
the 1860s.209
2. Ryan Williams
Williams’s own study of the due process of law yields conclusions
that are in certain respects closer to ours than are Chapman and
McConnell’s but are in other respects farther apart. Like Williams,
we find that the concept denoted by “due process of law” came to be
understood by 1868 to have different referents than it did in 1791.210
But we agree with Chapman and McConnell that Williams over-
states the difference, and we think that Williams does not com-
pletely capture the meaning of either clause.211
Williams contends that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of
Law Clause was not originally understood to apply to legislative
acts.212 To the contrary, as we have seen, the language of “due
process of law,” like “law of the land,” was understood by key
Framers, influential treatise-writers, and courts during the
Founding Era to forbid legislatures from depriving people of
207. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
208. Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1772.
209. Williams, supra note 6, at 462-63 (observing that by 1860 fourteen states had accepted
the vested-rights interpretation). 
210. See id. at 416.
211. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1677.
212. See Williams, supra note 6, at 511.
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common law procedural rights, engaging in what was in substance
adjudication rather than legislation, or otherwise violating a source
of superior law, such as a written constitution.213
Concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we share more common
ground with Williams than with Chapman and McConnell. Williams
finds that “due process of law” had by 1868 come to be understood
to prohibit legislative interference with vested rights and to
guarantee “general and impartial laws rather than ‘special’ or ‘class’
legislation that imposed particular burdens upon, or accorded
special benefits to, particular persons or particular segments of
society.”214 He denies, however, that due process of law was
understood to require that legislation be necessary to achieve
constitutionally proper ends and thus to authorize judicial inquiry
into “both the ends that the legislature sought to achieve and the
means employed to achieve such ends.”215 The latter understanding,
he argues, did not develop until the 1890s—the so-called “Lochner
era.”216
We agree that the police-power jurisprudence that developed in
state courts—and later in the Supreme Court—in the wake of the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment is distinguishable from
antebellum police-power jurisprudence in certain respects. In
particular, courts became more willing to look beyond the face of
enactments to discern and evaluate the propriety of legislative ends.
But there was continuity as well. Long before the Lochner era,
antebellum courts repeatedly affirmed that legislative power was
inherently limited by the ends for which legitimate governments are
established,217 and that legislatures could neither deprive people of
vested property rights nor constrain them in their life, liberty, or
property more generally, except—as Justice Harlan put it in
Mugler—to “protect the community, or to promote the general well-
being.”218
Prior to the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, state
courts upheld a variety of enactments as valid exercises of the police
213. See supra Part I.B.1.
214. Williams, supra note 6, at 425.
215. Id. at 426. 
216. Id. 
217. See infra notes 219-22 and accompanying text.
218. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 669 (1887).
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power, from prohibitions of dirt-removal from privately owned
beaches219 to regulations specifying the hours during which cattle
could be driven through the city streets220 to statutes authorizing
cities to make by-laws governing the interment of the dead.221 But
the scope of the police power was understood to be limited by its
functions—the protection of health, safety, and morals of the
public.222
For example, in the 1834 case of Austin v. Murray, the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court sustained a challenge to a by-law
prohibiting the bringing of the dead into Charlestown for purposes
of burial—a prohibition that solely affected Catholic parishioners.223
It did so because it was “manifest” to the court that “the object and
purpose” of a measure was not “made in good faith” and directed at
the “public good.”224 The court refused to uphold it simply because
it was passed “under the guise of a police regulation.”225
It might be argued that Austin is of little significance to the
originally understood scope of constitutional restrictions on state
legislation because it involved a by-law issued by a municipal
corporation. The trouble with any such argument is twofold. First,
the proposition that legislatures were not understood to be obliged
to pursue the public good whereas municipal legislations were
obliged to do so lacks support.226 Second, both by-laws and statutes
were evaluated by antebellum courts in order to determine whether
they were reasonably calculated to serve proper ends.227
219. Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 55 (1846). 
220. Cooper v. Schultz, 32 How. Pr. 107 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866). 
221. Coates v. City of New York, 7 Cow. 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827).
222. See Lowell J. Howe, The Meaning of “Due Process of Law” Prior to the Adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 18 CALIF. L. REV. 583, 609 (1930).
223. Austin v. Murray, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 121, 126 (1834).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. For contrary case law, see, for example, Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315, 318 (1870)
(drawing upon Austin and affirming that “[t]he law will not allow rights of property to be
invaded under the disguise of a police regulation” without drawing a distinction between state
statutes and municipal ordinances); Thorpe v. Rutland, 27 Vt. 140, 154 (1854) (“[A] statute
requiring land owners to build all their fences of a given quality or height, would no doubt be
invalid, as an unwarrantable interference with matters of exclusively private concern.”). 
227. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Adams, 7 Cow. 349, 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (upholding a
statute authorizing harbor masters to regulate and station vessels in the East and North
rivers only after determining that it was “calculated for the benefit of all,” and cautioning that
it “would not be upheld, if exerted beyond what may be considered a necessary police
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As Williams acknowledges, Thomas Cooley (whose views we
examine at length below) was “[b]y far the most influential of the
early post-Civil War commentators to address the meaning of due
process and law-of-the-land provisions”; Cooley’s discussion of those
provisions in his 1868 treatise focused on the “legitimacy of the
legislature’s objectives and the means pursued to attain those
objectives.”228 Cooley took the view that “grave ... constitutional
objection[s]” called the inquiry, not only into statutory text, but
“those facts of general notoriety, which ... are part of the public
history of the times.”229
We do not think that the letter of the Fourteenth Amendment
compels judges to implement the precise police-power doctrine that
was developed in either the early or late nineteenth century. But
implementing the Fourteenth Amendment does require a conception
of the legitimate ends of government that is consistent with the
original function—the spirit—of the Due Process of Law Clause in
the Fourteenth Amendment; and it requires a doctrinal approach to
give the text legal effect today.
3. John Harrison
John Harrison has criticized the view that, because “due process
of law” is synonymous with “law of the land” and “law of the land”
was understood to entail the opportunity to challenge the necessity
and propriety of government actions in judicial proceedings, so, too,
does “due process of law.”230 Harrison argues that the case against
regulation”); Bagg’s Appeal, 43 Pa. 512, 515 (1862) (“Any form of direct governmental action
on private rights, which, if unusual, is dictated by no imperious public necessity, or which
makes a special law for a particular person, or gives directions for the regulation and control
of a particular case after it has arisen, is always arbitrary and dangerous in principle, and
almost always unconstitutional.”). Even some decisions in which courts upheld legislation saw
judges expressing an understanding that legislative ends were constitutionally relevant. See,
e.g., Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. 376 (1860) (upholding statute providing that “no Black
Republican ... shall be appointed to any office” within a particular department but admitting
that the act would be unconstitutional if office-holding were “proscribed on account of ...
political or religious opinions”).
228. Williams, supra note 6, at 493-94.
229. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE UNITED STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 391 n.1 (photo.
reprint) 1972 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1868). 
230. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 542-44, 546-48, 551.
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substantive review of government actions under the Fifth Amend-
ment would be much stronger if “law of the land” had been used
instead of “due process of law,” because “a substantive reading [of
‘law of the land’] would be textually absurd.”231
Specifically, Harrison claims that the Supremacy Clause provides
that “[a]cts of Congress and treaties, the nonconstitutional sources
of federal law, are not just the law of the land, but ‘the supreme Law
of the Land.’”232 Thus, a reference to “law of the land” in the Fifth
Amendment would leave no room for substantive review of duly
enacted federal statutes—and neither does “due process of law,” if
indeed the terms are synonymous.233
Harrison’s critique rests upon a false premise. The Supremacy
Clause does not provide that all congressional acts become “the
supreme law of the land”—only those acts which are made in
pursuance of the Constitution.234 We have already seen in Marbury
and McCulloch that John Marshall denied that an “act” of Congress
that was not made in pursuance of the Constitution becomes part of
the law of the land. Furthermore, Marshall maintained that
determining whether a given act of Congress was made in pursu-
ance of the Constitution requires inquiry into whether it was
necessary to achieve constitutionally proper ends.235
Marshall’s understanding is consistent with Alexander Hamil-
ton’s exposition of the Supremacy Clause in Federalist 33, in which
Hamilton expressly denied that unconstitutional statutes became
part of the law of the land.236 Wrote Hamilton, “the clause which
declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union ... expressly confines
this supremacy to laws made pursuant to the Constitution.”237 Thus,
while a law authorized by the Constitution—for example, one
“laying a tax for the use of the United States”—“would be supreme
in its nature,” a law not authorized by the Constitution—for
example, one “for abrogating or preventing the collection of a tax
laid by the authority of the State, (unless upon imports and
231. Id. at 546. 
232. Id. at 546-47. 
233. Id.
234. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
235. Supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
236. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, supra note 12, at 161 (Alexander Hamilton).
237. Id.
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exports)”—“would not be the supreme law of the land, but an
usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution.”238
If indeed the “due process of law” is synonymous with “law of the
land,” there is nothing textually absurd about maintaining that due
process of law entails substantive review of federal or state statutes
if “the supreme law of the land” constrains the substance of leg-
islation, not merely the procedures by which a statute is enacted.
Harrison is wrong to assert that “[t]he law of the land is a variable
the value of which is given by whatever tells us what the law is.”239
Both the Supremacy Clause and the Due Process of Law Clauses
establish criteria that legislation must meet in order to be consid-
ered law.
Harrison also argues that the Due Process of Law Clause would
be redundant if it included limits on legislative power that were
already imposed by other constitutional provisions.240 But, as we
have seen with respect to the First Amendment and Commerce
Clause, acknowledging a judicial process by which statutes may be
challenged as beyond the “proper” powers of Congress to enact
before a person may be denied his or her life, liberty, or property
was a distinct textual recognition of what was theretofore merely
implicit.241
Be this as it may, as Chapman and McConnell observe, redun-
dancy is a weak objection, here and elsewhere, for “[t]he Constitu-
tion and Bill of Rights are shot through with prohibitions that some
Founders thought to be redundant with enumerated powers or
prohibitions.”242 Even on a procedural reading of the Fifth Amend-
ment that does not incorporate substantive review, the due process
of law would be redundant if it is understood—as it should be—to
guarantee jury trials in civil and criminal cases, given that such
trials are also guaranteed by other constitutional provisions.243
238. Id.
239. Harrison, supra note 3, at 547.
240. Id. at 548.
241. See supra notes 165-75 and accompanying text.
242. See Chapman & McConnell, supra note 8, at 1721.
243. See id. at 1718.
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4. Christopher Green
Finally, Christopher Green has accumulated a body of evidence
that “due process of law” in the Fourteenth Amendment and “duly
convicted” in the Thirteenth Amendment are synonymous, and that
neither phrase authorizes means-ends analysis.244 Green argues
that the term “duly convicted” was the product of “a tradition
stemming from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787”—a tradition that
“fully acknowledged the great evil of slavery ... and fugitive re-
enslavement in particular, while conceding that a slave could be
‘lawfully’ claimed and reclaimed.”245 According to Green, if “due
process of law” and “duly convicted” mean the same—or nearly the
same—thing, “due process of law” cannot possibly impose “substan-
tive constraints on statutes’ propriety,” as a “substantive” under-
standing of due process of law would exclude the possibility of
“lawfully” enslaving anyone, slavery being widely thought by
Republicans to be contrary to natural right.246 For this reason,
Green concludes that “due process of law” serves only as a guaran-
tee of access to regular judicial proceedings in which general,
prospective statutes are applied prior to criminal punishment.247
Green makes a compelling case that “duly convicted” was not
originally understood to forbid disproportionate criminal punish-
ments or criminal laws that did not serve legitimate ends.248 For
example, the proliferation of statutes that imposed unreasonably
harsh penalties for “frivolous offenses,” not in order to protect the
equal rights of all but to subordinate a particular group of people,
was understood by many Republicans to be an evil that would take
another amendment to eradicate.249
But Green’s case against means-ends analysis ultimately depends
upon his claim that “duly convicted” and “due process of law” are
synonymous.250 The evidence he marshals consists of several states’
244. Christopher R. Green, Duly Convicted: The Thirteenth Amendment as Procedural Due
Process, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 73, 75-78, 90-92, 113 (2017). 
245. Id. at 113.
246. Id. 
247. See id. at 111.
248. See id. at 95.
249. See id. at 92-95.
250. See id. at 90.
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prohibitions on slavery, a letter from Abraham Lincoln to Major
General Frederick Steele concerning Arkansas’s prohibition, and
explanations of the Thirteenth Amendment’s language by several
commentators.251
Adopted on January 19, 1864, Arkansas’s prohibition provided
that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude shall hereafter
exist in this State, otherwise than for the punishment of crime,
whereof the party shall [be] convicted by due process of law.”252 In
his letter, Lincoln described the Arkansas slavery prohibition as
“[t]here shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
in the punishment of crime whereof the party shall [be] duly
convicted”253—thereby translating “due process of law” into “duly
convicted.”254 Finally, commenting on the Thirteenth Amendment,
John Burgess noted in 1893 that “[a]ccording to the terms of [the
crime exception] it is only necessary that the person shall have been
duly convicted; that is, shall have been convicted by due process of
law.”255
This evidence, while probative, is insufficient to establish
synonymy. It is entirely consistent with the proposition that “due
process of law” was understood to guarantee certain judicial
proceedings prior to criminal punishment but was also understood
to guarantee considerably more than that. If “duly convicted” is not
synonymous with “due process of law” but instead captures a subset
of what the latter requires, there is no tension between the authori-
zation of judicial review of the content of legislation under the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause and the
Thirteenth Amendment.
Green could well be right that Charles Sumner’s view that
“injustice cannot be ‘law’”256 was not incorporated into the Thir-
teenth or Fourteenth Amendments.257 But we do not claim that the
251. See id. at 91-92.
252. Id. at 90 (quoting ARK. CONST. of 1864, art. V).
253. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Frederick Steele (Jan. 20, 1864), in 7 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 141 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
254. See Green, supra note 244, at 91.
255. 1 JOHN W. BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY 185, 207 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 1893).
256. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1712 (1864).
257. See Green, supra note 244, at 85-86, 91 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess.
1712 (1864)).
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Due Process of Law Clauses guarantee a judicial evaluation of
whether deprivations of life, liberty, or property conform with ideas
of justice that are unmoored from the original meaning of the letter
and the original spirit of the Constitution. We claim only that these
clauses (1) guarantee proceedings in Article III courts in which
legislative deprivations of life, liberty, and property may be
challenged for their conformity with the Constitution; and (2) the
Constitution limits the means and ends by which such deprivations
can permissibly be justified.
II. THE SPIRIT: IMPLEMENTING THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW CLAUSES
A. The Spirit of Due Process of Law: Barring Arbitrary Power
Having identified the original meaning of the “due process of law”
in both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, we now turn to how
it may be implemented in a way that is faithful both to its letter and
to its original spirit. As we have explained elsewhere, the “spirit” of
the text is its original functions, purposes, ends, or objects.258 What
was the original function (or functions) of the Due Process of Law
Clauses?
In Part I, we chronicled how the concept of due process of law has
been refined and even redefined over the course of centuries of
Anglo-American jurisprudence. But throughout its development, the
end or “spirit” of the concept remained the same: barring “arbitrary”
power over life, liberty, and property. In England, the “due process
of law” was designed to prevent innocent persons who had commit-
ted no breach of the law from being wrongfully deprived of their life,
liberty, or property by the Crown.259
But, while the English conception of “the law of the land” was
understood as a guarantee against arbitrary executive power,260 in
America the due process of law came to be understood as a guaran-
tee against all arbitrary government action.261 So the “due process
258. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 10, at 26-27.
259. See Prohibitions del Roy (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1342-43; 12 Co. Rep. 64, 64-65.
260. See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 36, at 194-95, 197-99, 202.
261. See Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819) (“As to the words
from Magna Charta ... after volumes spoken and written with a view to their exposition, the
good sense of mankind has at length settled down to this: that they were intended to secure
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of law” not only protected people from arbitrary power by providing
a judicial process by which a person could be accurately adjudicated
as guilty or innocent, it also protected people from arbitrary power
by denying that an arbitrary act of a legislature qualified as “a
law.”262 At all points, however, “the due process of law” was
understood to denote a concept of rule by principles that are
distinguishable from the mere will of the holders of power, and of
impartial adjudication in neutral courts of law.263 This is what “due
process of law” denotes in our Constitution.
“Arbitrary” is a difficult term to define, let alone apply with
precision. R. George Wright explains why context is critical in
determining whether something is arbitrary—just as it is in
determining whether something is “flat.”264 An airport runway and
a glass table might both be identified as “flat,” even though the
regularity of their surfaces is quite different.265 Why? As Wright
points out, “different purposes and interests are at stake, them-
selves largely creating the crucial differences in context.”266 Whether
a decision is “arbitrary” similarly depends on what purposes and
interests are at stake. Reasons that might count as reasonable
grounds for one’s decision to see a particular film—one’s mood on a
given day, and one’s desire to be entertained—would be rightly
regarded as arbitrary if used to ground a decision about whether to
throw someone in jail.267
The context with which we are concerned here is the exercise of
legal power under “this Constitution”—what distinguishes a mere
“act” of a legislature from “a law” that people have an obligation to
follow.268 We thus define arbitrariness with reference to the ends for
the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the
established principles of private rights and distributive justice.”).
262. See CONRAD, supra note 104, at 19, 131; Harrison, supra note 3, at 529.
263. See Harrison, supra note 3, at 529.
264. R. George Wright, Arbitrariness: Why the Most Important Idea in Administrative Law
Can’t Be Defined, and What This Means for the Law in General, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 842
(2010). 
265. Id. at 842-43.
266. Id. at 843.
267. See id. at 843, 849-50, 859.
268. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 11-12, 45-46, 48-49, 51-52 (2004) (describing and confronting the problem of
constitutional legitimacy). 
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which legitimate governments are established among men—accord-
ing to the political-philosophical premises on which this Consti-
tution rests—legitimate governments are established among men—
and the means which the Constitution authorizes to effectuate
those ends. Legislation that is contrary to those ends or means is
arbitrary—and therefore contrary to the original spirit of the Due
Process of Law Clauses.269
As we have explained, the letter of the Due Process of Law
Clauses requires a judicial proceeding—“due process”—of some kind
prior to any deprivations of life, liberty, or property.270 On this,
everyone who has studied the original meaning of the Due Process
of Law Clauses can agree. The disagreement concerns the scope of
that judicial proceeding. The term “of law” clarifies this by connot-
ing that a statute purporting to justify a deprivation of “life, liberty,
or property,” be a valid “law,” meaning it was within the constitu-
tional power of the respective legislature to enact.271 An arbitrary
269. We are aware, of course, of the body of public-choice-informed textualist literature on
statutory interpretation that seems to cast doubt upon the very notion that one can mean-
ingfully speak of legislative ends. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983) (stating that “it turns out to be difficult, sometimes impossible,
to aggregate [legislators’ preferences] into a coherent collective choice,” and citing Duncan
Black and Kenneth Arrow). While it is beyond the scope of this Article to engage with this
literature in any depth, our view is that while groups of individuals do not have collective
intentions in the sense of shared mental events, groups of individuals can decide to pursue
shared goals through agreed-upon means that are specified in legal instruments. Those
instruments may not expressly state the goals that their designers sought to achieve, but
goals can nonetheless be inferred from their text and structure. Even the most ardent tex-
tualists do not deny this. See, e.g., City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc.,
536 U.S. 424, 450 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding “[e]vidence of pre-emptive purpose
... in the text and structure of the statute at issue” (alteration in original) (emphasis and
internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658,
664 (1993))); Nat’l Tax Credit Partners, L.P. v. Havlik, 20 F.3d 705, 707 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Easterbrook, J.) (“Knowing the purpose behind a rule may help a court decode an ambiguous
text.”); John F. Manning, Federalism and the Generality Problem in Constitutional In-
terpretation, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2003, 2010 (2009) (“Textualists understand that statutes are
enacted to serve a purpose.”). For a nice distillation of this distinction in the constitutional
context, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 828
& n.57 (1982) (arguing that although “[p]ublic choice principles suggest that the ‘drafters,’ as
a group, may have no consistent intent.... [this] does not mean that the document they wrote
lacks a structure,” and that “the Court must discover and carry out the design of any given
[constitutional] provision”). 
270. See supra Parts I.B.1-2.
271. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
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statute is one that is not within what Hamilton referred to as the
“just and constitutional” powers of the legislature to enact.272
At the federal level, this requires a judicial inquiry as to whether
legislation falls within one of the delegated powers of Congress—
which includes the incidental powers expressly recognized in the
Necessary and Proper Clause—or is prohibited by the Constitu-
tion.273 At the state level, identifying arbitrary legislation requires
a judicial inquiry into whether (1) it is within the scope of power
that is delegated to state legislatures by their own constitutions;
and (2) whether it is prohibited by the federal Constitution’s limits
on state power, including Section One of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.274 For a state statute to be a law rather than a mere act of
power, it is necessary, but not sufficient, that a state constitution
authorize a particular exercise of power.275 Such acts must also not
deprive people of the due process of law or “abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States.”276
We will articulate a theory of the original letter and spirit of the
Privileges of Immunities Clause in future work. For present pur-
poses, it is enough to say that, on any of the competing original-
ist interpretations—other than the now-discredited one that the
clause is an indecipherable “ink blot”277—any judicial enforcement
of the clause clearly calls for some judicial evaluation of a state law
that extends beyond the terms of a state’s own constitution.278 In
other words, the text of the Fourteenth Amendment requires some
272. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 12, at 400 (Alexander Hamilton).
273. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411-13 (1819). Note, however, that
the Constitution also expressly recognizes “other[ ]” unenumerated “rights ... retained by the
people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
274. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 429-30, 436; Trs. of the Univ. of N.C. v. Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.)
56, 63 (1805).
275. See Jordan v. Overseers of Ohio, 4 Ohio 294, 309-10 (1831).
276. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
277. BORK, supra note 128, at 166 (opining that “[n]o judge is entitled to interpret an ink
blot,” and asserting, without citing authority, that “[the Privileges or Immunities] clause has
been a mystery since its adoption”). But see MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE:
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS passim (1986) (performing an
exhaustive historical inquiry into the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities
Clause); Bruce Ackerman, Robert Bork’s Grand Inquisition, 99 YALE L.J. 1419, 1430 (1990)
(book review) (observing that Bork “does not mention, let alone grapple with, important
books” that might have aided him in dissolving the ink blot). 
278. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 3, at 547.
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construction of the outer boundaries of state legislative authority
that judges can use to determine whether state law is abridging the
privileges or immunities of U.S. citizens.
Having now identified the original spirit of the Due Process of
Law Clauses—the prohibition of arbitrary power over life, liberty,
and property—we can begin to specify an approach that equips leg-
islators and judges to implement faithfully the original meaning
of their text.
B. Identifying Good-Faith Exercises of Legislative Discretion
Judges already routinely seek to determine whether legislative
enactments sought to be applied to individuals are law rather than
exercises of arbitrary power by a legislature, even if they do not use
this precise language.279 They do not, however, do so in all contexts
in which life, liberty, or property is at stake. Rather, since the late
1930s, judges have followed the Supreme Court’s lead in distin-
guishing between “fundamental” rights, burdens on which receive
exacting judicial scrutiny, and mere “liberty” interests that receive
more deferential scrutiny.280 While the doctrines governing tiers of
heightened scrutiny may be eroding, the lack of judicial protection
of economic liberty in particular remains entrenched.281
The story of the emergence of the tiers of scrutiny—anticipated in
a famous footnote in United States v. Carolene Products,282 and later
given an elaborate theoretical defense by John Hart Ely in his 1980
book, Democracy and Distrust283—has been told repeatedly. We will
not recount it again here.
One of us has argued that both the original “Footnote Four”
framework and its present incarnation contradict the express rule
of construction provided by the Ninth Amendment by relegating
279. See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016).
280. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
281. See Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2300, 2309 (holding unconstitutional state
restrictions on the unenmerated fundamental right to terminate a pregnancy after applying
the undue burden test, and rebuking the lower court for “equat[ing] the judicial review
applicable to the regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with the less strict
review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue”). 
282. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
283. See generally ELY, supra note 4, at 75-77.
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rights not textually “enumerated in the Constitution” to a less-
demanding standard of judicial review because they are not enu-
merated.284 But some form of tiered scrutiny might be defended, not
on the prohibited ground that some rights are textually enumerated
and others are not, but on the basis of concerns about institutional
competence.
Specifically, given that the judiciary is institutionally incapable
of thwarting all legislative opportunism, and will inevitably err in
identifying instances of opportunism, perhaps it makes sense for
judges to allocate scarce resources towards thwarting malign
legislative behavior that the judiciary is just better equipped to
identify and away from legislative behavior that it is more likely to
err in identifying. So, if judges are more likely to err in identifying
arbitrary burdens on economic liberty than they are in identifying
arbitrary burdens on, for instance, political speech, it might make
sense for judges to concentrate on the latter. As Neil Komesar has
observed:
The resource costs of judicial review ... depend on the ease with
which courts can distinguish valid from invalid governmental
activity, and their ability to formulate and articulate a corre-
sponding clear test. Clear tests mean fewer cases brought,
litigated, and appealed, and therefore a smaller burden on the
judiciary. Such clarity, however, involves a degree of arbitrari-
ness or, more gently, generalization, which risks invalidating
good legislation or accepting bad....
As the ... complexity of governmental regulation increased in
the 1930s, the costs of court involvement also increased.
Although many factors may have contributed to the retreat from
economic due process which occurred, the sizable and increasing
price tag for judicial involvement and the failure of judicial
strategies to control these rising costs pushed relentlessly in
that direction.285
We agree with Komesar that the emergence of tiered scrutiny can
be understood in part as a response to a perceived need to economize
284. See BARNETT, supra note 268, at 253, 255.
285. Neil K. Komesar, A Job for the Judges: The Judiciary and the Constitution in a
Massive and Complex Society, 86 MICH. L. REV. 657, 691-93 (1988).
2019] AN ORIGINALIST THEORY OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1649
on scarce judicial resources in an increasingly complex policy en-
vironment.286 We also agree that the courts need to be able to
“distinguish valid from invalid governmental activity” with some
degree of dispatch, given their heavy dockets and scarce judicial
time and energy.287 But Komesar’s analysis overlooks how the tiers
of scrutiny assumed by Carolene Products in 1938 were quite
different than today’s. Even if we assume arguendo that judicial
error rates increase dramatically in the context of evaluating
burdens on economic liberty,288 and that the Court in Carolene
Products was therefore right to distinguish between economic lib-
erty and other rights (if not for the precise reasons that Justice
Harlan Fiske Stone articulated), it does not follow that the current
allocation of judicial resources is correct.
In particular, modern rational-basis review often scarcely re-
sembles the inquiry into rationality that the judges conducted in the
twenty-four years between 1931—when the Supreme Court decided
O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co.289—and 1955—
when the Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical embraced what can be
called “conceivable-basis review.”290 It is not obvious that reducing
the error costs associated with wrongly upholding pretended
legislation by replacing “conceivable-basis review” with a standard
286. See id. at 691.
287. See id.
288. The claim that the legislative process is less likely to generate arbitrary products in
the context of economic regulation than it is in other contexts has been forcefully challenged.
See William H. Riker & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice:
The Political Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373, 398-99
(1988) (drawing upon public choice theory to advance the argument that the majoritarian
legislatures cannot be counted upon to respect citizens’ rights in any respect). But even if
legislators are equally likely to enact arbitrary economic regulations as to enact arbitrary
speech regulations, it does not follow that judges are equally likely to identify the first set of
regulations correctly as they are the second set; they may well be better at identifying the
second set. We stress that we are assuming institutional facts that might justify some form
of tiered scrutiny in order to critique the current form of tiered scrutiny, not making a
normative argument for a particular form of tiered scrutiny. We argue here only that the
rationality review articulated in Carolene Products is well-calculated to implement the spirit
of the due process of law.
289. O’Gorman & Young, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-58 (1931).
290. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955) (“[T]he law
need not be in every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough
that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”).
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that closely resembles the rationality review described in Carolene
Products itself would strain the judiciary to a breaking point. After
all, the Carolene Products Court did not think it would.291
To explain how the rationality review described in Carolene Prod-
ucts would give legislatures the space that they need to exercise
their constitutional powers for the benefit of the public while safe-
guarding the public against opportunism, we look to Justice Stone’s
opinion for the Court in Carolene Products and the lower court
decision that was reversed in Lee Optical.
1. Rationality Review: Means-Ends Fit
Constitutional scholars all remember Justice Stone’s affirmation
that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac-
tions” would henceforth be presumed constitutional.292 Few, how-
ever, seem to have noticed the length to which he went to make
plain that this presumption was rebuttable on the basis of facts
presented to a court.293 Justice Stone explained that “no pronounce-
ment of a legislature can forestall attack upon the constitutionality
of the prohibition which it enacts”; that “the constitutionality of a
statute predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts
may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have
ceased to exist”; and that “the constitutionality of a statute, valid on
its face, may be assailed by proof of facts tending to show that the
statute as applied to a particular article is without support in rea-
son.”294 He also assumed that “a statute would deny due process
which precluded the disproof ... of all facts which would show or
tend to show that a statute depriving the suitor of life, liberty or
property had a rational basis.”295
Stone’s formulation of rationality review contemplates that lit-
igants would be able to test legislation “by proof of facts” concerning
291. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938) (clarifying that
the judiciary may explore whether facts exist to support “a rational basis for legislation whose
constitutionality is attacked”).
292. Id. at 152. 
293. See id. at 153.
294. Id. at 152-54 (emphasis added).
295. Id. at 152 (emphasis added).
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its irrationality.296 Thus, legislation is not to be pronounced uncon-
stitutional “unless in the light of the facts made known or generally
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that
it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and ex-
perience of the legislators.”297 If “facts made known or generally
assumed” precluded that assumption, legislation would be pro-
nounced unconstitutional.298 And in Carolene Products the Court did
consider record evidence—however spurious299—about the alleged
essential health benefits of milk fat that had been presented to
Congress.
From 1910300 to 1976,301 only a three-judge panel consisting of two
federal district court judges and one circuit court judge, selected by
the chief judge of the district, could declare a state or federal statute
unconstitutional.302 As Michael Morley has detailed, “[t]hroughout
much of the twentieth century, Congress prohibited individual
federal judges from enjoining federal laws; only three judge panels
were permitted to adjudicate claims for injunctive relief against
allegedly unconstitutional federal statutes.”303
In 1954, a three-judge panel of the Western District of Oklahoma
took the Court in Carolene Products at its word. The lower court du-
tifully stated that “all legislative enactments are accompanied by a
presumption of constitutionality,” and that “[a] court only can annul
legislative action where it appears certain that the attempted exer-
cise of police power is arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory.”304
296. Id. at 153-54.
297. Id. at 152.
298. Id.
299. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397,
417 (explaining that although “[t]he case against filled milk had the appearance of scientific
rigor,” it was “utterly unproved”). 
300. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (1910) (repealed 1976).
301. Act of Aug. 12, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-381, §§ 1-2, 90 Stat. 1119, 1119 (1976).
302. See Comment, The Three-Judge Court Act of 1910: Purpose, Procedure and
Alternatives, 62 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 205, 205 (1971) (describing the origins,
benefits and procedural burdens of the three judge panel act). 
303. Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers
of the Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615, 631 (2017); see also Michael E. Solimine, Congress,
Ex parte Young, and the Fate of the Three-Judge District Court, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 101, 113-
18 (2008); Michael E. Solimine, Ex parte Young: An Interbranch Perspective, 40 U. TOL. L.
REV. 999, 1002-03 (2009). 
304. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. v. Williamson, 120 F. Supp. 128, 132 (W.D. Okla. 1954). 
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That the challenge to the statute’s constitutionality was heard by a
panel consisting of a circuit court judge, the chief judge of the
district, and a district court judge305 is itself evidence that rational-
ity review entailed a meaningful evaluation of the record evidence
and argument presented to the court by the parties at trial.
True to its mandate, the panel engaged in such an evaluation.
The Oklahoma statute in question, among other things, forbade
anyone but a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to “[f]it,
adjust, adapt, or to in any manner apply lenses, frames, prisms, or
any other optical appliances to the face of a person” or to replace any
lenses without a written prescription from an Oklahoma licensed
ophthalmologist or optometrist.306 
Writing for the panel, District Judge Wallace noted that written
prescriptions contain no instructions on how to fit glasses to the
face, indicating that the fitting “can skillfully and accurately be
performed” without specialized training.307 He highlighted the fact
that the device used to “measure[ ] the power of the existing lense
and reduce[ ] it to prescriptive terms”—the “lensometer”—was “not
operated by the physician but by a clerk in the office.”308
On the basis of these findings and other record evidence, the court
concluded that “[t]he means chosen by the legislature does not bear
‘real and substantial relation’ to the end sought, that is, better
vision.”309 Those means served only “to place within the exclusive
control of optometrists ... the power to choose just what individual
opticians will be permitted to pursue their calling”—an end to which
the legislature was not competent.310 The court did not directly
accuse the legislature of naked protectionism. It did, however, de-
termine that the discrimination against opticians was not rationally
justified as a health measure on the basis of the facts in the record,
and was therefore unconstitutional.311
305. Id. at 131.
306. OKLA. STAT. tit. 59, §§ 941-942 (1953). 
307. Lee Optical, 120 F. Supp. at 135.
308. Id. at 136-37.
309. Id. at 138 (citing Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 111 (1928)).
310. Id. at 137 n.20. 
311. Id. at 143.
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The Supreme Court, of course, reversed,312 applying a standard of
review that is difficult to imagine any legislation failing to satisfy.
Writing for the Court, Justice William O. Douglas made plain that,
henceforth, legislation reviewed under the Court’s constitutional
default standard of review would be upheld if the Court could
conceive of any hypothetical reason why the legislature might have
enacted that legislation—even if that reason found no support in the
record.313
In the instant case, despite acknowledging that it “appears that
in many cases the optician can easily supply the new frames or new
lenses without reference to the old written prescription,” Douglas
hypothesized that the “legislature might have concluded that the
frequency of occasions when a prescription is necessary was suf-
ficient to justify this regulation of the fitting of eyeglasses.”314 That
there was no evidence in the record that the legislature had so
concluded was immaterial to Douglas’s analysis.315 The move from
a realistic evidence-based inquiry into whether legislatures were
actually trying to achieve proper ends to a formalist hypothetical
inquiry into whether the legislature might have had proper ends in
sight, was significant.
The new standard would be carefully and precisely articulated by
Justice Clarence Thomas in an otherwise-obscure case: FCC v.
Beach Communications.316 Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas
stated that judges applying rational-basis review must uphold
legislation “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that
could provide a rational basis for [it]”; that those challenging
legislation must “negative every conceivable basis which might
support it”; and that the government need not justify legislation
with “evidence or empirical data.”317 As Justice John Paul Stevens
ruefully observed in concurrence, “conceivable[-basis review]” is
“tantamount to no review at all.”318
312. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
313. Id. at 487-88.
314. Id. at 487.
315. Id. at 487-88.
316. 508 U.S. 307, 313-16 (1993).
317. Id.
318. Id. at 323 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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The Carolene Products Court was on solid ground in assuming
that it would deny due process to allow the government to forestall
constitutional challenges by simply asserting the legitimacy of its
ends or to deny litigants the ability to demonstrate that legislation
was arbitrary.319 Yet, that is effectively what the “conceivable-basis”
standard of review that Justice Douglas articulated enables.320
2. Good-Faith Exercises of Legislative Discretion: 
Smoking out Pretext
We have seen how, in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall imposed
a judicially administrable limiting principle on the discretion of
Congress to enact laws that are necessary and proper for carrying
into execution its discretionary powers.321 His principle is worth
repeating:
[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers,
pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal,
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to say
that such an act was not the law of the land.322
In other words, courts are required to determine whether the dis-
cretion afforded Congress to enact laws that are “necessary and
proper”323 have been exercised in good faith. Or, as Hamilton ex-
plained in his defense of the constitutionality of a national bank,
Congress “has only a right to pass such laws as are necessary and
proper to accomplish the objects intrusted [sic] to it,” and that “[t]he
relation between the measure and the end ... must be the criterion
of constitutionality.”324
319. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-54 (1938).
320. See Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 487-88.
321. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819).
322. Id. (emphases added). 
323. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
324. Alexander Hamilton, Opinion of Alexander Hamilton on the Constitutionality of a
National Bank (Feb. 23, 1791), in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF
THE UNITED STATES: INCLUDING THE ORIGINAL BANK OF NORTH AMERICA 98 (photo. reprint
1967) (M. St. Clair Clarke & D. A. Hall eds., 1832).
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The rationality review employed by the lower court in Lee Optical
to evaluate the “relation between the measure and the end” can be
understood as an effort to determine whether the statute in ques-
tion was a good-faith exercise of the legislative power. In contrast,
conceivable basis review is a formalist shell—it preserves only the
appearance of a requirement to show that a law is necessary and
proper to accomplish an end entrusted to state governments.325
The due process of law to which a person is entitled before being
deprived of his or her life, liberty, or property requires a realistic
evaluation of a contested statute, not a formalistic one. We propose
that such an inquiry ought to operate as follows: Once a party has
made a threshold showing that he or she stands to be deprived of
his or her life, liberty, or property, the government should be made
to offer a reason for its actions and to bear the burden of producing
evidence in support of its actions. Judges should then determine
whether the government has demonstrated that its actions are
calculated to achieve a constitutionally proper end or ends—whether
the end sought is one to which the legislature is competent.
We have elsewhere described a theory of group agency that
makes the concept of a legislative end epistemologically coherent,
notwithstanding the reality that different legislators may have
different motivations and expectations, and we will not reiterate it
here.326 We stress, however, that such ends can be inferred from the
text, structure, and likely effects of legislation, and thus need not
entail direct inquiry into the motivations or expectations of any
particular individuals.327
Requiring the government to offer a reason for its actions, and to
bear the burden of producing evidence that its actions are calculated
to achieve a constitutionally legitimate end, comports with the spirit
of the Due Process of Law Clauses. Government officials are in
control of the evidence concerning the ends that legislation is
designed to achieve.328 Placing the burden of producing evidence on
325. See supra note 318 and accompanying text.
326. Barnett & Bernick, supra note 10, at 50-51. 
327. Id. at 51.
328. See Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1362 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining that “[a]
presumption is generally employed to benefit a party who does not have control of the
evidence on an issue,” and that it would therefore be “unjust to employ a presumption to
relieve a party of its burden of production when that party has all the evidence regarding that
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the government is likely to yield more evidence than would other-
wise be available.329 The government, after all, is the least-cost
producer of evidence related to the connection between its policies
and any proper end that those policies are said to be designed to
accomplish. Placing the burden of production on the government in
turn allows judges to better determine whether an action is nec-
essary to achieve a constitutionally proper end.
We have elsewhere argued that, because all judges, legislators,
and executive-branch officials receive their powers over resources
belonging to others after each having made a voluntary promise
to abide by the terms of “this Constitution,” such officials are
properly understood to be fiduciaries.330 Accordingly, they ought to
exercise their delegated powers in good faith, consistently with the
ends that they have been empowered to pursue, rather than in
pursuit of other ends.
Fiduciary law recognizes that excessive policing of fiduciaries
by generalist judges will do beneficiaries more harm than good.331
Besides discouraging competent would-be fiduciaries from entering
into fiduciary relationships in the first place, such monitoring may
defeat the purposes for which beneficiaries grant their fiduciaries
discretion by preventing those beneficiaries from receiving the
benefits of knowledge and judgment that both beneficiaries and
judges lack.332 
Yet, the risk of opportunistic behavior is too great, and the costs
that it imposes on beneficiaries too high for judicial review to be
toothless, whether the fiduciary be private or public.333 Similar costs
and benefits attach to policing legislation to protect the rights, priv-
ileges, and immunities of the People, who may not divest themselves
of the burdens of legislation the way shareholders may divest
themselves of stock.334
element of the claim”).
329. See id. (explaining that when a party has a burden of production, they “must present
evidence ‘to rebut or meet the presumption.’” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 301)).
330. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 10, at 23-26. 
331. See Mary Siegel, The Illusion of Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 599, 603-04 (2013) (providing rationale for Delaware courts’ use of the business judgement
rule, which gives fiduciaries significant room for error).
332. Id.
333. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 10, at 29-32.
334. Id.
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III. THE PROPER ENDS OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
To constitute a law, a legislative act must be “necessary and
proper” to achieve a constitutionally proper end.335 In considering
the scope of the Due Process of Law Clauses, we need not present a
theory of the full scope of federal or state legislative power. Instead,
we need only consider the propriety of that subset of enactments
that deprive a person of his or her life, liberty, or property. We have
shown that such laws must be consistent with constitutionally
proper ends.336 In this Part, we identify these proper ends.
A. The Ends of Congressional Power: Few and Defined
That the Constitution limits the ends—or what were referred to
as “objects”337—of the federal government is readily apparent; and
those ends are easy to identify. Article I vests “[a]ll legislative Pow-
ers herein granted” in “a Congress ... which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives.”338 Article I, Section 8, and Article
IV, Sections 1 and 3 list the permissible ends of federal statutes.339
To this list other ends have been added in a number of Amend-
ments.340 The Tenth Amendment then reaffirms that all powers that
have not been so “delegated to the United States by the Constitution
... are reserved to the States ... or to the people.”341
Among the powers delegated to Congress is the incidental power
to pass legislation that is “necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution” the ends that are provided in Article I and elsewhere in
the Constitution.342 The Necessary and Proper Clause is not a grant
of additional power—it is an acknowledgement of a power that
would exist absent its textual expression.343 (The inclusion of the
335. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 411-12 (1819) (emphasis omitted).
336. See supra notes 260-69 and accompanying text.
337. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 12, at 206 (James Madison).
338. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
339. See id. art. I, § 8; id. art. IV §§ 1, 3.
340. See, e.g., id. amends. XIII, § 2, XIV, § 5, XV, § 2, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XXIV, § 2, XXVI, § 2. 
341. Id. amend. X. 
342. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
343. See GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE, 111-14
(2010).
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word “expressly” in the Tenth Amendment—as it had been in the
Articles of Confederation—would have negated this implicature.)344
The claim that there was any broad agreement concerning the
scope of Congress’s powers during the Founding Era might be ques-
tioned in light of the constitutional debates that immediately broke
out after ratification. When then-Secretary of the Treasury Alexan-
der Hamilton proposed the incorporation of a national bank to a
Federalist-dominated first Congress in 1791, a flurry of opinions on
the subject were issued by Attorney General Edmund Randolph,
Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, and Hamilton himself.345
James Madison, then serving as a member of the first Congress,
delivered a lengthy speech concerning the constitutionality of the
bank bill, applying a list of principles that he believed ought to
guide consideration of whether assertions of government power were
authorized by the Constitution.346 Madison contended that it was
“not possible to discover in [the Constitution] the power to incorpo-
rate a Bank.”347
Rather than focus on the disagreements—much of which, we sub-
mit, concerns the particulars of a national bank—we wish to stress
the commonality between the opinions of Madison and Hamilton
with respect to incidental powers. Madison concluded that the
Necessary and Proper Clause must be “limited to means necessary
to the end, and incident to the nature of the specified powers,”348 and
he rejected any interpretation that would “give an unlimited dis-
cretion to Congress” and thus “destroy[ ]” the “essential characteris-
tic of the Government, as composed of limited and enumerated
powers.”349 But Madison did not deny that the national government
344. Id.
345. See Letter to George Washington from Edmund Randolph (Feb. 12, 1791), NAT’L
ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-07-02-
0200-0001 [https://perma.cc/3PAT-KL9T]; Letter to George Washington from Thomas
Jefferson (Feb. 15, 1791), NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.archives.gov/
documents/Washington/05-07-02-0207 [https://perma.cc/K9LN-UBC8]; Letter to George
Washington from Alexander Hamilton (Dec. 13, 1790), NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Washington/05-07-02-0035 [https://perma.cc/G7WV-
7NPS].
346. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1944 (1791) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
347. Id. at 1896. 
348. Id. at 1898.
349. Id. 
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had unenumerated, incidental powers to carry enumerated powers
into execution.350 Indeed, he acknowledged that “some discretionary
power, and reasonable latitude must be left to the judgment of the
legislature” in pursuing the “great ends of government” set forth in
the Constitution.351
Likewise, in defending the constitutionality of his bank proposal,
Hamilton did not argue that Congress enjoyed unlimited discretion.
To the contrary, he affirmed that government power was inherently
limited, writing that “no government has a right to do merely what
it pleases”352—which is a succinct definition of an arbitrary power.
As we noted above, like Madison, Hamilton maintained that the
national government created by the Constitution “has only a right
to pass such laws as are necessary and proper to accomplish the
objects intrusted to it,” and stated that “the relation between the
measure and the end ... must be the criterion of constitutionality.”353
Nearly thirty years later, Chief Justice John Marshall would
reach the same conclusion as Hamilton. In McCulloch, Marshall set
forth his own now canonical construction of the Necessary and
Proper Clause: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.”354
Apart from some loose talk about “convenien[ce],”355 the actual
construction adopted by Marshall in McCulloch was largely con-
sistent with both Madison and Hamilton’s insistence that some
means-end scrutiny—“the relation between the measure and the
end”—was required to set the boundaries of incidental powers.356
In addition, as we have noted, Marshall advocated a judicial
inquiry into whether legislative claims to be pursuing an enumer-
ated object or end are asserted in good faith or are instead pretextu-
al.357 Marshall stressed that the Court would be bound to invalidate
350. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
351. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 111, at 423 (statement of James Madison).
352. Hamilton, supra note 324, at 98 (emphasis omitted).
353. Id. (emphases added).
354. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
355. Id. at 422.
356. See supra notes 348-53 and accompanying text.
357. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
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legislative acts that, although cast as measures calculated to
achieve legitimate ends, were in fact efforts to usurp powers not
delegated to Congress.358
Identifying such pretextual legislation in particular cases and
controversies could necessarily entail pursuing the government’s
true ends by measuring the fit between the government’s purported
ends and its choice of means, as both Hamilton and Madison had
favored. Otherwise, Congress could in practice do what it pleased,
so long as it pointed to a proper power and claimed that it was
seeking to accomplish an object “intrusted to [the government].”359 
In short, Marshall favored judicial scrutiny of the good faith of
congressional assertions of powers—the basic approach we are
proposing here. On Marshall’s account, Congress may not act to
accomplish ends that it is not constitutionally empowered to pursue
on the pretext of pursuing proper ends act honestly—rather than
pretextually. And judges are bound to keep Congress honest.360
Our claim can therefore be summarized thus: (1) Congress has a
constitutional duty to act in ways that are necessary to carry into
effect proper enumerated or incidental powers; (2) legislative en-
actments that are not necessary or proper are not made “pursuant
to” the Constitution and, therefore, do not become part of the su-
preme law of the land; (3) the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of
358. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423 (“[S]hould Congress, under the pretext of
executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the
government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal, should a case requiring such
a decision come before it, to say that such an act was not the law of the land.” (emphasis
added)). 
359. Hamilton, supra note 324, at 98. As we explain in Barnett & Bernick, supra note 10,
the Supreme Court’s decision in U.S. v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), rejected sub silentio this
limitation of congressional power identified by Marshall. Barnett & Bernick, supra note 10,
at 43-44. 
360. Marshall would subsequently draw upon fiduciary principles in defending his opinion
in McCulloch, as well as rely on the limiting principle of the “pretext” passage to avoid the
charge that the opinion of the Court was too latitudinarian. See John Marshall, A Friend of
the Constitution I, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 15, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S
DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 207, 211 (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969) (“[T]he whole
political system is founded on the idea, that the departments of government are the agents
of the nation.”); John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution III, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July
2, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, 173 (“Congress
certainly may not, under the pretext of collecting taxes, or of guaranteeing to each state a
republican form of government, alter the laws of descents; ... the means [must] have a plain
relation to the end.”).
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Law Clause forbids the federal government from depriving individu-
als of life, liberty, or property without a judicial process to ensure
that such a deprivation is pursuant to the law of the land; (4) thus,
this judicial process includes ascertaining whether the government’s
actions are necessary and proper means of carrying into execution
a power delegated to Congress, rather than delegated to another
branch of government, or not delegated at all.
We do not claim that particular substantive limitations on
congressional power are contained in the text of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Rather, we are claiming that the Fifth Amendment expressly
recognizes the fundamental right to a judicial process to ensure that
someone’s life, liberty, or property is not being deprived, except by
a constitutionally valid exercise of legislative power. The exact scope
of these legislative powers is specified elsewhere.361 In the case of
the federal government, it is to be found in the limited objects or
powers identified in the text of the Constitution.362 In the case of
states, it is to be found both in the texts of state constitutions and
in the inherent limits on all legislative power, whether or not such
limits are expressly acknowledged in a state constitution.363 We now
turn to these limits.
B. The Ends of State Legislative Power: General but Not
Unlimited
Because the powers of state governments are not enumerated in
the federal Constitution,364 determining whether state legislators
are constitutionally bound to pursue any particular set of ends is
more complicated than determining whether federal officials are so
bound. After all, Madison described the powers of state governments
as “numerous and indefinite,”365 and the Tenth Amendment refers
to “powers ... reserved to the States respectively, or to the people,”
without specifying which remaining powers are reserved to states
and which are reserved to the people.366
361. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
362. See, e.g., id.
363. See, e.g., id.; VA. CONST. art IV, § 14.
364. See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
365. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 12, at 208 (James Madison).
366. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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Nevertheless, in the wake of the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment, state courts and, later, the Supreme Court needed to
develop a construction of the scope of state power to give effect to
the text of both the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law
Clause and its Privileges or Immunities Clause. Once the latter had
effectively been redacted by the Court in The Slaughter-House
Cases367 and United States v. Cruikshank,368 the Due Process of Law
Clause was made to do most of the work protecting individual rights
against state legislation.369
As we have seen, the concepts of the “law of the land” and “due
process of law” had come to be understood to forbid not only in-
terference with purely procedural rights but also deprivations of
vested rights and arbitrary distinctions between persons and
groups, as well as other deprivations of life, liberty, or property that
served no proper governmental end.370
While the text of the Constitution specifies the ends or objects of
congressional power by which the constitutionality of federal
legislation can be assessed,371 the substantive protection from
arbitrary power provided by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process of Law Clause372 would be empty without an implementing
construction of the appropriate ends of state power, against which
an act of the legislature can be evaluated.373 After 1868, courts
adopted and refined the police power doctrine that state courts had
367. 83 U.S. 36, 78-80 (1873).
368. 92 U.S. 542, 565-66 (1876).
369. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 564 (2003). It should be clear by this point
that we are not defending review of the content of legislation under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clauses as a mere second-best compensating adjustment
for the redaction of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. In a world with a reliably enforced
Privileges or Immunities Clause, judges and legislators would still be required by the original
meaning of the Due Process of Law Clause to evaluate the substance of legislation when the
Privileges or Immunities Clause did not apply. People who are not U.S. citizens, for instance,
are not covered by the Privileges or Immunities Clause, but would be able to challenge
arbitrary deprivations of life, liberty, or property under the Due Process of Law Clause. But
the just powers of Congress over noncitizens may differ from its powers over citizens of the
United States, who may enjoy additional privileges or immunities.
370. See discussion supra Part I.D.
371. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8-10.
372. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
373. See discussion supra Part I.D.
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begun to develop during the antebellum period.374 It is to this
judicial construction we now turn.
1. The Origins of the “Police Power” Before 1868
At the time of the framing, the phrase “internal police” or “police”
was used to refer generally to the reserved powers of the states.375
For example, writing for the Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief
Justice Marshall distinguished between “regulations of [interstate]
commerce” and police power regulations.376 The latter encompassed
“[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every descrip-
tion, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a
State.”377
The police power was not a new concept—it could be traced back
centuries.378 As Markus Dubber has explained, the historical police
power authorized a powerful few to rule over their supposed in-
feriors.379 It was rooted in a conception of state government as
household governance—the householder’s absolute power to arrange
the household for the common good of the whole family served as a
model for absolute continental monarchies.380
Such an unlimited concept, however, was in pronounced tension
with the republican form of government authorized by the Consti-
tution. In addition, it would ill-serve the needs of courts to find a
judicially administrable line against which exercises of state pow-
er challenged as arbitrary could be measured. So, in nineteenth-
century America, the police power was given a more limited
374. See infra Part III.B.2.
375. See BARNETT, supra note 268, at 324-25, 328 (surveying usage). For instance,
Pennsylvania incorporated a provision into its constitution that stated that “the people of this
State have the sole, exclusive and inherent right of governing and regulating the internal
police of the same.” Constitution of Pennsylvania—September 28, 1776, AVALON PROJECT,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp [https://perma.cc/F492-TFGD].
376. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824). 
377. Id.
378. For a comprehensive history of the police power across continents and centuries, see
generally MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE POLICE POWER: PATRIARCHY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (2005). For an overview of the police power as both a source of and
limitation upon state police power in America, see generally Daniel B. Rodriguez, The
Inscrutable (Yet Irrepressible) State Police Power, 9 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 662 (2015).
379. See DUBBER, supra note 378, at 3.
380. See id. at 48-50. 
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meaning.381 While space constraints prevent us from examining the
origins and doctrinal development of the police power in detail, we
can sketch its general contours.
Judges and legal commentators evaluating exercises of state
power under state constitutions frequently noted the difficulty of
defining the contours of the police power.382 Judges nonetheless
made efforts to confine the police power to certain objects and to
determine whether government officials were actually pursuing
those objects when they invoked the police power.383 The police
power was sometimes conceptualized as a means of enforcing a
common law maxim governing the law of nuisance—sic utere tuo, ut
alienum non lædas—use your own property in such a way that you
do not injure other people’s.384 An influential 1843 opinion, written
by Judge Lemuel Shaw,385 distilled it thus:
We think it a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well
ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however
absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it
shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to
the rights of the community.386
In the early nineteenth century, judicial scrutiny of legislative ends
was not particularly rigorous. Caleb Nelson observes that judges
limited themselves almost exclusively to the face of statutes in
evaluating them.387 Consider the 1833 case of Hoke v. Henderson,
which saw the North Carolina Supreme Court maintaining that a
381. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.
382. DUBBER, supra note 378, at 120 (“Virtually every definition of the police power was
accompanied by the remark that it cannot be, and has not been, defined ... [it] ‘has remained
without authoritative or generally accepted definition.’” (quoting ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE
POWER, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS iii (1904))). 
383. See DUBBER, supra note 378, at 120-21.
384. See, e.g., State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 41 (1842); State v. Glen, 52 N.C. 321, 327 (1859);
Shaw v. Kennedy, 1 N.C. (Taylor) 158, 160, 163 (1817); Thorpe v. Rutland, 27 Vt. 140, 149
(1855). 
385. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. 53, 64 (1843).
386. Id. at 84-85.
387. See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784,
1790 (2008). 
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legislature could not validly use its admitted power over other as-
pects of the clerks’ offices for the purpose of expelling clerks from
office.388 Judge Ruffin’s opinion noted that “if the law [were] couched
in general terms, so that the Court, which cannot inquire into mo-
tives not avowed, could not see that the act had its origin in any
other consideration but public expediency,” the court would “be ob-
liged to execute it as a law.”389 
Crucially, Ruffin added, such a general enactment, if designed to
accomplish an end not grounded in public expediency but simply to
expel the clerks, would be given effect by judges “not because it was
constitutional, but because the Court could not see its real charac-
ter, and therefore could not see that it was unconstitutional.”390 The
implication was that such an enactment would indeed be unconsti-
tutional but that judges could not invalidate it. In declining to
inquire into legislative ends, judges sometimes advanced arguments
based on the separation of powers, emphasizing the respect owed to
members of a coordinate branch and that branch’s unique province
and duty to legislate.391
We stress that this judicial hesitancy or restraint is wholly sep-
arate from identifying the substantive scope of a state’s police pow-
er. It is downstream from a vision of the judicial role—a vision that
is itself a constitutional construction, not part of the original mean-
ing of the text of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
If judges are textually bound by the original meaning of the Due
Process of Law Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to
evaluate whether legislative enactments depriving persons of their
lives, liberty, or property are arbitrary—as we maintain they are—
there is no textual bar against judges realistically evaluating “the
relation between the measure and the end”392 when those ends are
388. See 15 N.C. 1, 29-30 (1833); see also Jordan v. Overseers of Dayton, 4 Ohio 294, 309-10
(1831) (“If the state should pass a law for the purpose of destroying a right created by the
constitution, this court will do its duty [and hold it void]; but an attempt by the legislature,
in good faith, to regulate the conduct of a portion of its citizens, in a matter strictly pertaining
to its internal economy, we can not but regard as a legitimate exercise of power.”).
389. See Hoke, 15 N.C. at 26. 
390. Id. at 27.
391. See, e.g., Sunbury & Erie R.R. v. Cooper, 33 Pa. 278, 286 (1859) (“[T]he judicial
authority of the state is instituted to judge of the fulfilment of the duties of private relations,
and not to decide whether legislators have faithfully fulfilled theirs.”).
392. Hamilton, supra note 324, at 98 (emphasis omitted). 
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cleverly disguised. After the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted,
this is just what happened.
2. Police Power Doctrine After 1868: Securing the Rights
Retained by the People
Nineteenth-century judges and commentators never quite con-
fronted—let alone resolved—the tension between the unlimited
historical police power and the Constitution’s premise of limited
government. But, after the Fourteenth Amendment imposed new
federal constraints on state power, judges made efforts to render the
police power safe for a constitutional republic393 in a manner that
echoed the Declaration of Independence.
After affirming that “all men are created equal,” and “that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that
among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness,” the
Declaration offered the following concise summary of the purpose of
all legitimate government: “That to secure these rights, Governments
are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.”394 According to this vision, “just powers”
are those which are delegated by “the governed” in order to secure
the individual rights of “Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Hap-
piness.”395
Thomas M. Cooley, the Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme
Court and a professor at the University of Michigan, as well as its
Dean,396 formulated the question confronting judges in any case
involving a purported exercise of the police power thus: “[W]hether
the State exceeds its just powers in dealing with the property and
393. See Howe, supra note 222, at 589 (examining police power cases and concluding that
they are unified by the Lockean premise that “government cannot take from any person life,
liberty or property except when such a taking is necessary to secure life, liberty and property
to the individuals generally who compose society”). For an argument that the attribution of
the police power to American governments was a negative development, despite such efforts
to “limit the damage,” see HAMBURGER, supra note 98, at 466 n.a (contending that it has
“undermined the specialized and enumerated powers established by American constitutions”).
394. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
395. Id.
396. See Thomas M. Cooley, MICH. L. (2009), https://www.law.umich.edu/history
andtraditions/faculty/Faculty_Lists/Alpha_Faculty/Pages/Cooley_ThomasM.aspx [https://
perma.cc/PH7Q-GQ6R].
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restraining the actions of individuals.”397 What were those “just
powers?” Cooley articulated a construction of the police power that
is consistent with the premises of the Declaration:
The police of a State ... embraces its system of internal regula-
tion, by which it is sought not only to preserve the public order
and to prevent offenses against the State, but also to establish
for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good
manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent
a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted
enjoyment of his own, so far as is reasonably consistent with a
like enjoyment of the rights by others.398
Cooley made no effort to create a comprehensive list of proper state
powers, believing that one could not enumerate all of “the various
cases in which the exercise by one individual of his rights may
conflict with a similar exercise by others.”399 Instead, he focused on
whether the state’s actions were calculated to safeguard the rights
of individuals.
In an impressive survey of late nineteenth-century police power
decisions, Howard Gillman argued that their dominant theme was
hostility to class legislation—legislation that singled out particular
groups for burdens and benefits, on the pretext of a public-oriented
goal.400 Cooley’s focus on natural and civil rights—as well as that of
courts that cited him as an authority—revealed Gillman’s analysis
to be incomplete.401 
While judges in the late nineteenth century were certainly op-
posed to class legislation, numerous opinions link concerns about
the singling out of particular groups with concerns about violations
397. See COOLEY, supra note 229, at 572 (emphasis added).
398. Id.
399. See Id. at 746.
400. See HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF
LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 102-04 (1993); see also V.F. Nourse & Sarah
A. Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal Protection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955, 964
(2009) (describing how state courts struck down laws that were not “general and public,” and
which operated unequally during the antebellum period).
401. For an extensive critique, see generally David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism,
Revised: Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1
(2003). For a defense of Gillman’s emphasis on class legislation, see generally Barry
Cushman, Some Varieties and Vicissitudes of Lochnerism, 85 B.U. L. REV. 881 (2005).
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of individual rights.402 Still other police power cases did not deploy
any class legislation analysis, and focused solely on whether chal-
lenged measures were calculated to promote a proper end.403 
For example, in the 1885 case of In re Jacobs, the New York Court
of Appeals invalidated a ban on tenement cigar making after de-
termining that it was “not a health law” and “ha[d] no relation
whatever to the public health.”404 That the court regarded the ban
as pretextual legislation can be gleaned from its declaration that
“[u]nder the mere guise of police regulations, personal rights and
private property cannot be arbitrarily invaded,” and from its citation
to Chief Justice Marshall’s language concerning pretext in
McCulloch.405
Yet the court also lavished attention upon the fundamentality of
the right implicated by the ban: “the right of one to use his faculties
in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his
livelihood in any lawful calling, and to pursue any lawful trade or
avocation.”406 It was because that right was sacred and inalienable
that the court considered itself to be duty-bound to determine
whether the ban had “at least in fact some relation to the public
health, that the public health [was] the end actually aimed at, and
that it [was] appropriate and adapted to that end.”407 Because the
court was “not ... able to see” any of those things, it pronounced the
act “unconstitutional and void.”408
Once the “due process of law” had come to be understood to
require an inquiry into whether a legislative act either deprived
402. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 279-80 (1932) (invalidating
legislation on grounds of interference with economic liberty and favoritism); Adkins v.
Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 556 (1923); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905). 
403. See, e.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros., 270 U.S. 402, 408, 414 (1926) (invalidating as
“arbitrary” and “unreasonable” a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting the use of “shoddy” in the
manufacture of bedding); Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504, 516-17 (1924)
(invalidating as “essentially unreasonable and arbitrary” a Nebraska statute permitting
variations from standard bread weights of only two ounces per pound within twenty-four
hours after baking); S. Covington & Cin. St. Ry. v. City of Covington, 235 U.S. 537, 548-49
(1915) (invalidating as unreasonable a requirement that the temperature of street cars never
be permitted to fall below fifty degrees Fahrenheit). 
404. 98 N.Y. 98, 114 (1885). 
405. Id. at 110, 112. 
406. Id. at 106. 
407. Id. at 115.
408. Id.
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individuals of vested rights or was directed at benefitting or
burdening particular groups or individuals without furthering any
legitimate legislative end, such legislative acts came to be under-
stood as mere “pretended legislation.”409 But, distinguishing a valid
law from pretended legislation would be impossible without some
means of distinguishing proper from improper legislative ends.410
Giving effect to the letter of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process of Law Clause (and the Privileges or Immunities Clause)
thus requires a conception of what the limits of legislative power
are—that is, what distinguishes a genuine law from what the
Supreme Court would describe as “mere will exerted as an act of
power.”411 What could legislatures do, consistent with nineteenth-
century police power doctrine?
Legitimate exercises of the police power could be grouped under
two headings: regulations and prohibitions. Legislatures were
understood to have the just power to make rightful activities—
activities that do not inherently injure other people—regular, that
is, specify the modes in which they could be conducted so as to
prevent rights violations ex ante (rather than relying solely on ex
post lawsuits for damages).412 Thus, both the specification of what
is required to make contracts legally binding and the specification
of speed limits reduce the risk of accidental injury. Legislatures
were also understood to have the just power to prohibit wrongful
activities that inherently injure others, such as theft, murder, or
fraud.413 By securing the individual rights retained by the people in
either of these ways, legislatures promoted the public good.414
Yet, if perhaps police power jurisprudence was not in fact as
incoherent as it was later made out to be by its “realist” critics,415
409. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. app. 124 (1856) (statement of Rep. John Bingham)
(attacking “pretended legislation” recently passed by Kansas pro-slavery legislature, which
he believed to be unconstitutional); see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15
(U.S. 1776) (charging George III with “combin[ing] with others to subject us to a Jurisdiction
foreign to our [C]onstitution, and unacknowledged by our [L]aws; giving his Assent to their
[A]cts of pretended Legislation”).
410. Cf. BARNETT, supra note 268, at 331.
411. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
412. Cf. id. at 535-37.
413. See BARNETT, supra note 268, at 337.
414. See id. at 331-33.
415. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Legal Theories and Social Science, 25 INT'L J. ETHICS 469,
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neither was it ever as entirely coherent as this conceptual grouping
might suggest. And it became less coherent over time.416 In the wake
of an evangelical movement to simply obliterate certain categories
of property (namely, liquor and lottery tickets) deemed harmful to
the welfare of the community—not because their possession or sale
violated anyone’s rights but simply because they were deemed
immoral—the malleability of the “public morals” prong of police
power doctrine became apparent.417
Although some scholars have described morals regulation as a
context in which American jurists frequently upheld restraints on
personal liberty and property rights,418 John Compton details in The
Evangelical Origins of the Living Constitution how this description
“greatly overstates the nineteenth-century judiciary’s affinity for
morals regulation.”419 Compton shows that while “nineteenth-
century judges rarely questioned the legitimacy of traditional forms
of morals regulation,” those regulations were justified in terms of
“the maintenance of public order,” rather than “the eradication of
[private] vice.”420 Further, judges at first resisted novel morals
regulations advanced by evangelical reformers that they deemed
incompatible with traditional limits on government power.421 While
upholding traditional liquor licensing laws, judges struck down key
components of temperance legislation that banned the manufacture
and sale of intoxicating liquors altogether.422
480 (1915); Edward S. Corwin, Social Insurance and Constitutional Limitations, 26 YALE L.J.
431, 431-32 (1917); Robert L. Hale, Value and Vested Rights, 27 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 529
(1927).
416. See Corwin, supra note 415, at 431-32.
417. See infra notes 418-26 and accompanying text; cf. Corwin, supra note 415, at 431-32
(explaining how courts elastically construed the “police power” to allow the state to promote
the “general welfare” by legislation “reasonally adapted” to that end).
418. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 314 (1973) (con-
cluding that vested rights “in liquor, lottery tickets, gambling, and sex never appealed much
to [nineteenth]-century judges”); WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND
REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 149 (1996) (explaining that morals regulation
was the “easy case” in which private rights were trumped by public power); Herbert
Hovenkamp, Law and Morals in Classical Legal Thought, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1427, 1446-
47 (1997) (explaining the duality between “economic individualism” and “moral collectivism”
traceable to the colonial period).
419. JOHN W. COMPTON, THE EVANGELICAL ORIGINS OF THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 8 (2014).
420. Id. (emphasis added).
421. See id.
422. See id. at 110-11.
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But this resistance did not last. Compton describes how judges
sympathetic to the reformers’ cause, or simply unwilling to buck
popular opinion, upheld liquor and lottery prohibitions by sweeping
them within the malleable “morals” prong of the police power.423 The
Supreme Court in Mugler v. Kansas would eventually uphold these
laws as well, sanctioning the constitutionality of a state prohibition
on manufacturing liquor against a due process of law challenge in
which the plaintiffs alleged that the law did not fall within the scope
of the police powers.424 
Writing for the Court, Justice John Marshall Harlan insisted that
the Court had a solemn duty to invalidate purported police mea-
sures with “no real or substantial relation” to the ends of “protect-
[ing] the public health, the public morals, or the public safety.”425
But, he wrote, “we cannot shut out of view the fact, within the
knowledge of all, that the public health, the public morals, and the
public safety, may be endangered by the general use of intoxicating
drinks.”426
As J. I. Clark Hare observed in an 1889 treatise, American Con-
stitutional Law, the Mugler majority treated liquor as an inherent-
ly noxious category of property comparable to poisons or infected
merchandise, without any concerted effort to demonstrate that li-
quor was “hurtful ... when used in moderation.”427 It thereby allowed
the police power to escape its traditional bounds without establish-
ing an objective standard for evaluating future claims that a given
measure was within the scope of the police power.428 This lapse
would prove costly.
Realists would later point to the Court’s acquiescence in such
legislation as evidence that police power doctrine did not rest upon
any coherent principles but merely upon judicial preferences.
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s pithy and highly influential
Lochner dissent provides a famous example. To illustrate that “[t]he
liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere
423. See id. at 89-90. 
424. 123 U.S. 623, 653, 657 (1887). 
425. Id. at 661. 
426. Id. at 662. 
427. J. I. Clark Hare, Lecture XXXIV, in 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 746, 772
(Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1889).
428. See id. at 772-73.
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with the liberty of others to do the same”429—paraphrasing Herbert
Spencer’s Law of Equal Freedom, defended in his book Social
Statics—was a mere “shibboleth.”430 Holmes alluded to the Court’s
lottery decisions.431
Further, judicial scrutiny of statutes to identify pretended leg-
islation often left much to be desired when the stakes were highest.
Though typically not recognized as such, perhaps the most appalling
failure of the old police power jurisprudence is Plessy v. Ferguson,
in which the Court upheld Louisiana legislation forbidding private
street-car operators to provide service to both Blacks and Whites.432
Writing for the Court, Justice Henry Brown spent all of a single
paragraph analyzing “whether the statute of Louisiana is a rea-
sonable regulation.”433 Brown emphasized that “there must neces-
sarily be a large discretion on the part of the legislature,” and that
legislatures are “at liberty to act with reference to the established
usages, customs and traditions of the people, and with a view to the
promotion of their comfort, and the preservation of the public peace
and good order.”434
The Plessy Court’s deference to “established usages, customs and
traditions,” and its failure to require any proof of a threat to “the
public peace and good order,” posed by integrated trollies, nor
inquire into the true ends of the challenged legislation (as it had in
Yick Wo v. Hopkins435) was symptomatic of a jurisprudence that all
too often took the government’s representations concerning its ends
at face value.436 Indeed, Plessy was decided just three years after
429. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
430. Id.
431. See id.; see also Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 468 n.70 (1909)
(highlighting how the judiciary had once maintained that “simple legislative declaration[s]”
could not destroy the right to sell or possess liquor but now permitted liquor to be transformed
into a “nuisance per se” (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wynhamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 454
(1856))).
432. 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
433. Id. at 550. 
434. Id. 
435. 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (holding unconstitutional a facially neutral San Francisco
ordinance that required everyone who operated a wooden laundry to secure a permit after
determining that it was designed to discriminate against the Chinese).
436. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550.
2019] AN ORIGINALIST THEORY OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1673
James Bradly Thayer published his paean to judicial restraint in
the Harvard Law Review.437
As Justice Harlan pointed out in his now-canonical dissent, “[e]v-
ery one knows that the statute ... had its origin in the purpose, not
so much to exclude white persons from railroad cars occupied by
blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied by or
assigned to white persons”438—not to promote “public peace”439 but
to stamp Blacks with a “badge of servitude.”440 Accepting the
majority’s premise that “[i]f the power exists to enact a statute, that
ends the matter so far as the courts are concerned,” Harlan denied
that the government was constitutionally empowered to pursue the
end of establishing a “superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens.”441
The end being sought was not one “to which the legislature was
competent.”442 In short, under the pretext of exercising legitimate
power, the legislature had exercised arbitrary power.443
Harlan’s Plessy dissent could serve as a blueprint for consistent
and effective review of the state’s exercise of their police powers.444
But as the majority’s analysis makes plain, no such blueprint was
consistently followed.445 For every decision in which the Court did
smoke out pretext after context-sensitive analysis of the govern-
ment’s means and ends during the late nineteenth-century, one can
point to another in which they fell short.446 We need an approach to
adjudication that can better effectuate both the letter and the
original spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment.
437. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). Thayer argued that legislation should “not ... be declared
void unless the violation of the constitution is so manifest as to leave no room for reasonable
doubt.” Id. at 140 (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 4 Binn. 117 (1811)).
438. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
439. Id. at 550 (majority opinion).
440. Id. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
441. Id. at 559.
442. Id.
443. See id.
444. See id. at 552-64.
445. See id. at 545 (majority opinion).
446. Compare Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), with Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S.
27 (1885) (refusing to inquire into ends of facially neutral ordinance prohibiting night work
only in laundries, despite allegation that the purpose was to force Chinese-owned laundries
out of business). 
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3. Protecting the Health, Safety, and Morals of the Public
We have generalized that the police power allows for the prohibi-
tion of acts that necessarily violate the rights of others—such as
laws prohibiting murder, rape, robbery, theft and the like. There is
universal consensus that state legislative power can be used to
punish rights violations after they have occurred.447 We have also
maintained that the police power allows for the regulation of
behavior that risks violating the rights of others to prevent the
violations from occurring. This type of regulation falls under the
traditional rubric of regulations to protect the health and safety of
the public.448 Again, there is universal consensus on the propriety of
this state legislative power—even as some may contest whether
particular health and safety restrictions accomplish the end they
purport to seek.449
As we have noted, some authorities also included a third object or
end of legislation: the protection of the public morals.450 A subset of
such laws would clearly be warranted under the rights-protective
conception of the police power: laws that regulate conduct in the
“public sphere” by which is meant areas under the control of gov-
ernment to which the general public has access. These areas include
streets, sideways, alleyways, and public parks.451 
We also stress that, while the scope of the police power most
certainly did not include the taking of property from one person, or
“class,” to give to another solely on the grounds that the latter would
benefit from the taking,452 there was no constitutional barrier to
legislatures using their general tax power to establish assistance
programs for the poor, or otherwise providing goods that would go
447. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 378, at 664-65.
448. See id. at 676.
449. See id.
450. See Howe, supra note 222, at 609.
451. See BARNETT, supra note 268, at 331 (arguing that such laws fall within the “Lockean
construction of the police power of the states”).
452. That is, it did not include what Cass Sunstein has termed “naked preferences.” Cass
R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1689 (1984)
(arguing that numerous constitutional provisions, including the Due Process of Law Clauses,
forbid “the distribution of resources or opportunities to one group rather than another solely
on the ground that those favored have exercised the raw political power to obtain what they
want.”). 
2019] AN ORIGINALIST THEORY OF THE DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1675
undersupplied by the market—absent government intervention.453
Whereas the tax power could sometimes be used in a regulatory
fashion, in which case it would be subject to the same limitations as
other police power regulations,454 the use of the tax power by a state
to raise revenues to support public works—or otherwise promote
public welfare—was a power distinct from the police power to
regulate rightful exercises of liberty and prohibit wrongful acts.455
All of these exercises of the state police (and tax) powers were
generally accepted in 1868 and remain so today.456 To assess wheth-
er a deprivation of life, liberty, or property is arbitrary requires
courts to assess whether there is a sufficient relationship between
the means adopted and these undisputed ends to conclude that the
measure was adopted in good faith—the measure need not be
Kaldor-Hicks efficient.457
With all this consensus in mind, we are left with one last claim of
a police power “end” that is in dispute: whether states may prohibit
conduct performed in private and outside the view of the general
public—conduct that has no external social costs associated with it
that would justify categorizing it as a nuisance—on the sole ground
that the legislature deems such conduct to be immoral.458 Address-
ing this question at length in this space would take us too far
afield.459 But, to provide a sense of our answer, we offer three
observations.
453. See Rodriguez, supra note 378, at 677.
454. Whatever may be the precise scope of the tax power, it is beyond the scope of this
Article.
455. See Rodriguez, supra note 378, at 677.
456. See Howe, supra note 222, at 609.
457. A policy is Kaldor-Hicks efficient if (a) those who reap net welfare gains because of the
policy can compensate those who incur net welfare losses because of the policy and still
remain better off than they were before the policy was made; and (b) the losers could not
afford to offer the gainers enough to agree to forego their gains. For a discussion, see
MATTHEW D. ADLER, WELL-BEING AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION: BEYOND COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
98-99 (2012). Although it has been criticized—costless redistribution from gainers to losers
never really takes place—Kaldor-Hicks efficiency remains “indispensable to applied welfare
economics.” ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 42 (6th ed. 2012). We agree
with Justice Douglas that judges should not hold state laws unconstitutional, solely “because
they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955). 
458. See Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners, at 16-
17, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) (No. 02-102).
459. See id. at 3 (arguing at length that states have no such power).
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First, regardless of what view one takes on this issue, people of
diverse constitutional views can agree that the rest of the above-
discussed legislative ends—protecting public health and safety and
regulating public conduct so as to minimize rights-conflicts—are
proper.460 So, nothing prevents courts from using these ends to
engage in a means-ends analysis to prevent arbitrary legislative
acts.461 Second, a power to regulate or prohibit private conduct
outside of spaces controlled by the government on behalf of the gen-
eral public, solely on the basis that it is immoral, is not contained
anywhere in the text of the Constitution—either expressly or by
implication.462 If such a power exists, it is because judges say it
exists.
Consequently, third, because no private morals power is textually
specified, whether or not there exists such a power is a matter of
constitutional construction.463 For us, that is no deal breaker. But
whether such a power is the best construction of the letter of the
text of the Constitution will depend on whether it can fairly be
within its original spirit.464 We have demonstrated that the Due
Process of Law Clauses were designed to bar arbitrary exercises of
legislative power.465 We doubt that the regulation of purely private
acts on the basis of morality can be nonarbitrary in actual opera-
tion.
How would a legislature justify such a measure? Would it engage
in philosophical or religious analysis of morality? Would it hold
hearings on these moral claims? How could a citizen contest it?
Would she be permitted to introduce “expert” testimony of moral
philosophers or religious authorities? How could a court evaluate
such moral claims when advanced by parties to a constitutional
challenge? Would a judge reach a “finding” on whose moral stance
was more justified?
460. That is to say, an “incompletely theorized agreement” can be reached about the
constitutional propriety of protecting public health, safety, and public morals. Cass R.
Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1735 (1995); see CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 35-61 (1996) (defining and
describing incompletely theorized agreements).
461. See Williams, supra note 6, at 494.
462. See Brief of the Institute for Justice, supra note 458, at 14.
463. See id. at 15.
464. See Barnett & Bernick, supra note 10, at 3.
465. See id. at 14.
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In practice, such debates are typically waged, not in terms of
morality, but in terms of risks of empirically ascertainable harms to
the general public.466 Bare moral disapproval is rarely considered
sufficient to justify such measures in the absence of sometimes
dubious empirical claims of harm to others that would fit within the
health and safety rationales about which a consensus exists.467
Even in the early republic, one finds a stark contrast between
strict adultery, antisodomy, obscenity laws (in those places where
such measures existed), and lax enforcement.468 We are not sur-
prised that—as Lawrence Friedman has documented—“a surge of
interest in victimless crime, in vice, in sexual behavior”469 took place
during the late nineteenth century, when moralistic Progressivism
driven by a marriage of evangelical religious fervor and quack
science became influential.470
The existence of the earlier laws has been offered as evidence that
states do in fact have the constitutional power to prohibit purely im-
moral activities—regardless whether they pose any risk of injury to
anyone.471 We think the better view is that these laws were regarded
as means of protecting members of the public from injury—but the
connection between means and ends was very attenuated. For
example, Thomas West has detailed the lengths to which Americans
went in the early republic to promote marriage in the belief that it
was “indispensably necessary for the securing of natural rights.”472
466. See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 110 STAN. L. REV. 101, 103-4 (2006)
(describing how and why “disputes over the morally sectarian visions to be expressed by the
law” have been replaced in modern liberal societies by “contestation over the means to be
employed to attain society’s secular ends”); Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational
Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1661, 1682 (2016) (tracing—and criticizing—the Court’s
privileging of “consequentialist, utilitarian” ends over “[c]onstitutive [e]nds” related to the
expression of the social meaning of behavior). 
467. See id. at 1672.
468. See THOMAS G. WEST, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 230 (2017)
(finding that this contrast “characterized all [the Founders’] sex and marriage policies”). 
469. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 138 (1993). 
470. See generally COMPTON, supra note 419; THOMAS C. LEONARD, ILLIBERAL REFORMERS:
RACE, EUGENICS & AMERICAN ECONOMICS IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA (2016). 
471. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-93 (1986) (declining to recognize “a
fundamental right to homosexuals to engage in acts of consensual sodomy” because “[s]odomy
was a criminal offense at common law and was forbidden by the laws of the original 13 States
when they ratified the Bill of Rights,” and “when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified,
all but 5 of the 37 States in the Union had criminal sodomy laws”).
472. See WEST, supra note 468, at 219.
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He also showed how morals regulations—in particular, prohibitions
on various kinds of sex outside of marriage—rested on that belief,
rather than the belief that states enjoyed plenary power to shape
and mold a virtuous citizenry.473
The communicative content of the constitutional text, however,
does not require us to accept any particular set of morals laws as
sufficiently connected to the end of rights-protection to be within the
states’ reserved powers. To repeat, we do not believe that the
communicative content of the constitutional text is so thick. 
We think the rationality review deployed by the three-judge panel
in Lee Optical is well-tailored to implement the anti-arbitrariness
spirit of the Due Process of Law Clauses.474 Under such rationality
review, some strict morals laws might have been found unconstitu-
tional in the early republic as well as now.475 Had they been widely
enforced, the issue of their unconstitutionality would then have
been joined in earnest.476 But they were not enforced, so it was not
joined in earnest.477
In our view, any purported governmental end, the scope of which
cannot be objectively assessed by a citizen or independent judiciary,
poses an intolerable risk of arbitrariness. In practice, how far
legislators may go in the service of such an end will depend solely
upon their own will. In the parlance of present day constitutional
practice, the claim that legislatures may deprive a person of life,
liberty, or property on the sole ground that the legislature deems
her act to be immoral lacks a judicially administrable limiting
principle.478 And such a limiting principle is necessary to implement
the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment’s text.479
Having offered these preliminary remarks on the propriety of
regulating activities conducted in private solely on the ground that
they are immoral, we close by reiterating that very few laws purport
473. Id. at 232 (“[T]he founders believed that discouraging sex outside of marriage (both
heterosexual and homosexual) promotes the integrity of marriage, which they regarded as a
fundamental condition of the social compact required by natural rights theory.”).
474. See supra notes 309-11.
475. See WEST, supra note 468, at 228.
476. See Brief of the Institute for Justice, supra note 458, at 16.
477. See id.
478. See Howe, supra note 222, at 598.
479. See Williams, supra note 6, at 505.
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to be justified in this way.480 Instead, most deprivations of an
individual’s life, liberty, and property purport to be justified as
reasonable means to safeguard the health and safety of the general
public, or to regulate conduct in the public sphere.481 In short, the
overwhelming preponderance of laws are claimed to serve ends that
nearly everyone agrees are within the just powers of state govern-
ments.482 If so, what matters is whether the means adopted have
such an attenuated connection to these ends as to indicate that they
were adopted to serve other forbidden ends outside the original
scope of the legislative power.483
C. Beyond Securing the Rights Retained by the People?
To assess whether a person is being deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law requires an inquiry into
whether a legislature has acted pursuant to its just powers.484 We
have argued that scope of the powers of state governments be
defined with reference to the original function of the police power in
1868, which was based on a natural rights-based theory of the
nature and limits of government.485 Some will object that this
conception is too narrow—that the scope of government power in
general, and state power in particular, was not understood to be so
limited in either 1791 or 1868, and that the amended Constitution
is the product of “many minds” and resists any unified theory.486
As Jack Balkin has summarized, prominent historians (among
them, Bernard Bailyn, J.G.A. Pocock, and Gordon Wood) have
documented the influence of a “civic republican” tradition upon
Founding Era thought.487 This tradition was characterized by
opposition to monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy no less than to
480. See Brief of the Institute for Justice, supra note 458, at 16.
481. See Rodriguez, supra note 378, at 677.
482. See id. at 679.
483. See Sunstein, supra note 452, at 1718.
484. See Howe, supra note 222, at 592 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Md. v. Williams, 9 G.
& J. 365, 408 (Md. 1838)).
485. See id. at 590.
486. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT
DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 8 (2009). 
487. See Jack M. Balkin, Which Republican Constitution?, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 31, 46-49
(2017).
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direct popular rule; belief in the priority of the public good; commit-
ment to civic equality; opposition to “domination” either in civil
society or in politics; commitment to self-rule, understood as
representative government; and opposition to corruption.488 Bailyn,
Pocock, Wood, and others have contended that Founding Era
thought “owed as much to the ideas of James Harrington, Baron de
Montesquieu and ‘Country Party’ ideology, as [it] did to the work of
John Locke and the liberal tradition of natural rights.”489
We have no quarrel with the proposition that those who drafted
and ratified the unamended Constitution, those who amended it in
1791, and those who amended it in 1868 were influenced by a
variety of political-philosophical sources. But, we think the pur-
ported tension between civic republican and Lockean liberal tra-
ditions has been exaggerated and may stem, in part, from a failure
to appreciate how the concept of the “public good” was understood
within Lockean liberalism.490 In an illuminating study of the concept
of the public good within classical liberalism, generally, George H.
Smith has shown that neither Locke nor his followers denied that
government had an obligation to promote the public good or that the
government might regulate—or even prohibit actions—that indi-
viduals would otherwise take in order to so promote it.491 Rather,
they were convinced that the public good was best promoted through
the protection of natural rights, and such civil rights as had proven
necessary to secure natural rights.492
488. Id.
489. Id. at 44. For helpful overviews of this scholarship, see Daniel T. Rogers, Repub-
licanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. HIST. 11, 17 (1992); Robert E. Shalhope, Toward
a Republican Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American
Historiography, 29 WM. & MARY Q. 49, 57-58 (1972); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Re-
publicanism: Educating for Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 135 (1995).
490. GEORGE H. SMITH, THE SYSTEM OF LIBERTY: THEMES IN THE HISTORY OF CLASSICAL
LIBERALISM 27 (2013).
491. See id. at 26-48.
492. See id. at 28. Smith notes that Madison recommended that a declaration be affixed to
the Constitution that read, in part, “[t]hat government is instituted, and ought to be exercised
for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right
of acquiring and using property, and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and
safety.” Id. at 29 (quoting James Madison, Speech in Congress Proposing Constitutional
Amendments, reprinted in JAMES MADISON: WRITINGS 441 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999)). This,
Smith argues, is “the natural-rights paradigm of the ‘public good,’” and “illustrates the
restrictive function of the public good in classical liberalism.” Id.
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Determining whether this Lockean conviction stands up under
scrutiny today is beyond the scope of this Article. We are concerned
with whether that conviction was an essential part of the political-
philosophical contexts in which the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments were drafted and ratified. It is anachronistic to project into
the context of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century constitutional
communication a conflict that was not perceived until the late
twentieth century.
We find that Founding Era affirmations—of which there are
many—that natural rights could be constrained by legislatures to
promote the public good rested upon the premise that such con-
straints were necessary “to secure and to enlarge ... the natural
rights” of members of the public.493 When people during the Found-
ing Era spoke of the necessity of giving up or surrendering their
natural liberty for the sake of the public good, they did not mean
that the government could define the public good as the “felt ne-
cessities of the time”494 seem to demand and invoke that public good
to deprive people of their liberty. Rather, they meant that securing
the rights of all required individuals to transfer powers to the gov-
ernment that they would otherwise be able to exercise personally in
the state of nature—just not as effectually—and to submit to
constraints upon the exercise of the natural freedom that they
retained.495
Any relinquishment of freedom was understood to be a trade.496
It was thought that all individuals would enjoy more freedom as a
consequence, than they would otherwise.497 For example, by sur-
rendering the right to personally execute the law of nature and
receiving in return the civil right to the protection of the laws by an
impartial enforcer, one gains more overall security for one’s natural
rights.498
493. James Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 1053, 1061 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007).
494. O. W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881).
495. See Shalhope, supra note 489, at 59.
496. See Daniel A. Farber & John E. Muench, Ideological Origins of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENT. 235, 241 (1994).
497. See id.
498. See id.
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Because the Founders did not identify the public good with
whatever values were presently held by the general public, the
purported conflict between the public good and individual rights did
not take the form that some historians have posited.499 While the
exercise of individual rights could, in certain contexts, be contrary
to the public good and regulated accordingly—that is what the police
power was for—the public good sought was the increased security
and enlargement of the rights of all.500 The core of the concept held
throughout the Founding Era.501
The case for deploying natural rights theory to implement the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause is strength-
ened by investigation of the publicly available context in which it
was enacted.502 The influence of natural rights-infused abolitionist
constitutionalism on Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress has
been well-documented, as have the premises on which that con-
stitutionalism rested.503 As Michael Kent Curtis has summarized
in his pioneering study of the Fourteenth Amendment, “by 1866
leading Republicans in Congress and in the country at large shared
a libertarian reading of the Constitution,”504 according to which,
“[g]overnment existed, as the Declaration of Independence asserted,
to protect natural rights.”505
The men who shaped the Fourteenth Amendment repeatedly and
publicly articulated a theory of government according to which, as
John Bingham put it, government’s “primal object must be to protect
each human being within its jurisdiction in the free and full en-
joyment of his natural rights.”506 This is not to say that the Four-
teenth Amendment enacts Locke’s Second Treatise, much less
499. See Rogers, supra note 489, at 25.
500. See Farber & Muench, supra note 496, at 241.
501. See id. at 242-43.
502. See id. at 246.
503. See, e.g., CURTIS, supra note 277, at 236; JACOBUS TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW
117-19 (1965); JACOBUS TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMEND-
MENT 115-18 (1951); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONAL-
ISM IN AMERICA, 1760-1848, at 202-03 (1977); Randy E. Barnett, Whence Comes Section One?
The Abolitionist Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 165 passim
(2011); Farber & Muench, supra note 496, at 235-36; Timothy Sandefur, Privileges, Im-
munities, and Substantive Due Process, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 115, 135 (2010).
504. CURTIS, supra note 277, at 215. 
505. Id. at 41.
506. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., app. 139 (1857).
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Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.507 It is to say that insofar as
constitutional decision makers must construct a framework for
implementing the Constitution’s guarantees of due process of law,
that framework must be informed by a theory of the nature and
limits of government, period—not just the expressed limits on the
federal government. And such a theory informed the original design
of those guarantees, thereby infusing its spirit.508
CONCLUSION
Our good-faith theory of the due process of law can guide
legislators and judges by providing clarity concerning the nature of
legitimate government ends, and by equipping legislators and
judges with tools that enable them to pursue those ends. It enables
those who draw discretionary power from the Constitution to
discharge the duties that come with it—and to achieve the purposes
for which they were entrusted with that power. It also helps the rest
of us to monitor their performance of their duties.
Legislating is a decidedly complex activity. But it is not irreduc-
ibly complex, and we do not need to start from scratch in developing
a theory of the nature or limits of government power. We have a
written Constitution that was informed by a rich theory of the “just
powers” of government, and carefully designed to implement that
theory. Accurately identifying the original meaning of the letter of
Due Process of Law Clauses, along with their original function or
spirit, is the key to ensuring that we enjoy the substance of the
Constitution’s promises.
507. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
508. See Sandefur, supra note 503, at 172.

